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Abstract 
This paper provides evidence of the growing similarity in capacity of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.  
In 1960, nonprofit hospitals maintained on average more than three times as many beds per hospital as 
their for-profit counterparts; following a monotonic decline in relative size, by 2000, the average 
nonprofit hospital was only 32% larger than the typical for-profit hospital. Hospital level data for the 
United States indicate that the convergence was driven primarily by industry-wide effects such as entry, 
exit and ownership switches, rather than expansions or downsizing of existing hospitals. These findings 
suggest that hospitals may in fact strategically choose their ownership type (nonprofit vs. for-profit status) 
and hence, their regulatory environment. Accordingly, I develop a model in which firms have identical 
objectives but differ in their ability to benefit from a given ownership form. In contrast to the existing 
literature, this approach relies neither on different ownership type-specific objectives nor on market 
failure to generate an equilibrium in which both ownership types are chosen by a strictly positive fraction 
of hospitals. Changes in the economic environment alter firms’ incentives to maintain a given ownership 
type. This in turn induces firms to modify their capacity and encourages some firms to switch their 
ownership type. Crowding-out of government hospitals, population growth and increasing involvement of 
the government in the healthcare market may account for the convergence in size. Policymakers and 
legislators often exert pressure on nonprofit hospitals by tying tax-exemptions to hospital-level measures 
of community benefits such as free care for the indigent. I argue that by omitting industry-wide effects of 
a hospital’s tax-exempt status on price and industry output, such pressure may both lead to convergence 
in size and be welfare decreasing. Analysis at the state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level as 
well as at the hospital level corroborate the principal theoretical predictions. 
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“The adoption of the nonprofit form does not change human nature”† Richard Posner 
 
1. Introduction 
Private hospitals in the US can organize as either nonprofit or for-profit institutions, but 
nonprofit hospitals have been dominating the hospital industry with a persistently large 
share of beds (about 70%) over the period from 1960 to 2000. Nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals are also subject to different regulatory rules, in particular the tax code. 
Specifically, nonprofit hospitals are eligible for exemptions from property, sales, and 
income taxes. However, despite these legal and regulatory distinctions, there has been 
growing similarity in capacity between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals during these 
four decades1.  
 
According to aggregate US data, collected and published by the American Hospital 
Association (AHA), in 1960 nonprofit hospitals maintained on average more than three 
times as many beds per hospital as their for-profit counterparts. Following a monotonic 
decline in relative size, by 2000, the average nonprofit hospital was only about thirty 
percent larger than the typical for-profit hospital. I find that eighty percent of the 
convergence in size is attributable to a convergence in the number of admissions (i.e. 
volume) and the remaining twenty percent is accounted for by a convergence in lengths 
of stay (i.e. duration). Moreover, using hospital level data for the US, I find that the 
convergence in size was driven primarily by industry-wide effects such as entry, exit and 
ownership switches, rather than expansions or downsizing of existing hospitals.  
 
In light of these findings one might ask which factors may have contributed to this 
convergence between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. How would these factors affect 
the provision of services to indigent patients, access to care and welfare? And does the 
documented convergence of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals provide grounds for 
changes in tax policy? One objective of this paper is to take another step towards 
answering such questions by developing a theoretical framework that explains the 
                                                 
† Opinion, Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 870 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986) 
 
1 The trend of growing similarity in capacity or convergence in size, is documented and described in 
section 2 of this paper. 
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convergence between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in the United States over the 
period from 1960 to 2000.  
 
Authors who find similarities between the two ownership types often question whether 
and to what extent today’s nonprofit hospitals really differ from their for-profit 
counterparts.2 These empirical studies and others, however, pay little attention to the 
process by which for-profit and nonprofit hospitals grew similar. Theoretical models that 
are constructed to explain the behavior of nonprofit firms in general and nonprofit 
hospitals in particular, promote the idea that when a firm is not organized with the 
explicit goal of maximizing profits, applying conventional neoclassical models of firms is 
not appropriate. Yet, similar to the empirical literature, the effort to explain the difference 
in behavior, efficiency, objectives, and quality of care between nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals almost entirely omit dynamic considerations. 
 
The evidence on convergence presented here, as well as the large body of research on 
switching across ownership types, highlights the importance of the economic and 
regulatory environments, in which hospitals of different ownership types operate. In fact, 
hospitals may choose their ownership type (nonprofit vs. for-profit status) strategically 
and hence select their regulatory environment. From this perspective, it is the differential 
ability to benefit from a given ownership status, and not some underlying difference in 
objectives, that accounts for discrepancies in behavior across hospitals. To develop and 
explain this interpretation more formally, I present a model in which firms have identical 
objectives yet heterogeneous technical capabilities that encourage them to choose 
different ownership forms in order to attain their organizational goals. In contrast to the 
existing literature, this approach relies neither on different ownership type-specific 
objectives nor on market failure to generate an equilibrium in which both ownership 
types are chosen by a strictly positive fraction of hospitals.  
 
Changes in the economic environment alter firms’ incentives to maintain a given 
ownership type. This in turn induces firms to modify their capacity and encourages some 
firms to switch their ownership type. This approach suggests that positive demand 
                                                 
2 For example: Duggan (2000), Frank and Salkever (2000), Malani et. al. (2003), McClellan and Staiger 
(1999), Sloan (2000a) and Sloan et al. (2000b). 
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shocks, negative supply shocks and the increasing involvement of the government in the 
healthcare market may account for the growing convergence in size. I test these 
predictions in two ways: first, I construct measures for the model’s parameters and 
analyze the convergence trend using state and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level 
data. Secondly, I exploit detailed hospital-level data on expenditures to test the model’s 
equilibrium predictions with respect to the intensity of hospitals’ perks-related behavior.  
 
As the nature of local competition is central for assessing the true contribution of 
nonprofit hospitals to their communities, omitting such industry-wide effects may lead 
policymakers and legislators to support interventions that may decrease welfare. In 
particular, tying tax-exemptions to hospital-level measures of community benefits such as 
free care for the indigent might represent excessive pressure. In turn, requiring nonprofit 
hospitals to appropriate a fraction of their surplus towards activities labeled as 
community benefits stimulates the convergence in size. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the emergence of the convergence 
process between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals observed over the past forty years in 
the United States. The third section introduces a taxonomy of economic models of 
nonprofit hospitals that encompasses existing models and shows how my model relates to 
the literature. Section 4 considers a general model that aims to provide a rationale for the 
coexistence of for-profit and nonprofit firms in the same market. In addition, this model 
explains the original differences in capacity as well as the subsequent convergence 
between the two ownership types. Using hospital level data from the US from the AHA 
and IRS, and regional demographic data from the US census and other sources, the fifth 
section provides a closer look at the convergence process across different locations in 
attempt to validate the theoretical predictions. The sixth section provides a discussion of 
the general views presented in this paper and their policy implications. Section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
 4
2. The Dynamics of the US Hospital Market 
The dominance of nonprofit hospitals, and their persistently large share of beds (about 
70%) over the period from 1960 to 2000, led most researchers to promote the idea that 
permanent discrepancies in objectives distinguished nonprofit and for-profit providers. 
As a result, the US hospital market is often portrayed as stagnant with respect to its 
ownership composition. A notable exception is found in Gray (1991), who lists four 
major dimensions in which nonprofit hospitals grew similar to for-profit hospitals: the 
growing reliance of nonprofit hospitals on revenues from the sale of services, their 
dependence on economic performance for gaining access to capital, the decline in local 
control resulting from the rise of the multi-institutional systems and the growing 
involvement of nonprofit hospitals in types of hybrid arrangements, such as management 
and departmental contracts, restructuring, joint ventures and alliances3.   However, an 
important dimension was overlooked - the growing similarity in capacity of for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals. According to Hansmann et al. (2002) little empirical work has 
focused on the impact of ownership form on hospitals’ capacity choice. This section 
provides evidence for the growing similarity in capacity and studies its nature, 
determinants and the channels, through which it was routed.  
 
Figure 2.1 presents the ratio of nonprofit to for-profit hospitals based on the average 
number of beds per hospital, from 1928 to 2000. For more than three decades, between 
1928 and the early 1960s nonprofit hospitals maintained on average more than three 
times as many beds per hospital as their for-profit counterparts, by 2000 the average 
nonprofit hospital was only 32% larger than the typical for-profit hospital.4  
                                                 
3 “Business terminology and business thinking have pervaded the nonprofit hospital world.”, and “reliance 
on the sale of services for economic survival has important consequences ..... nonprofit status can become 
more of a convenience than a necessity or an expression of philosophy.” Gray (1991). Moreover, since 
nonprofit hospitals generate most of their revenue from sales of services they fit into Hansmann’s (1980) 
definition of “commercial nonprofits”. 
 
4 This convergence in capacity, from the 1960’s on, is mirrored by the convergence in utilization, though at 
a slower rate: While in 1960, a nonprofit hospital admitted on average 2.8 times more patients per hospital 
than a for-profit hospital, by 2000 that figure had fallen to 1.47 (See subsection 2.2 for detailed discussion). 
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While the downward sloping part of the nonprofit-to-for-profit ratio curve begins in the 
mid-1950s, there was no dramatic change, taking place at that time that might have 
triggered the subsequent convergence trend. However, it might be more sensible to think 
that the introduction of the Medicare and Medicaid programs in 1965 prompted the trend, 
setting the stage for the growing similarity among hospitals of different ownership type. 
This assertion is not rejected by the data since the downward sloping segment between 
the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s can be attributed to cyclical fluctuations, which seems 
to characterize the early part of the series quite well.  
In order to study changes in the size distribution of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, I 
use hospital-level data for the years 1970, 1982 and 1998. Figure 2.2 presents a 
percentile-percentile graph that illustrates the dissimilarity between the size-distribution 
of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in a given year as well as demonstrates the 
convergence of these size-distributions over time.  Percentiles for the for-profit hospitals 
appear on the x-axis while percentiles for the nonprofit hospitals appear on the y-axis. 
Convergence in the average number of beds per hospital, between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.
Sources: 1928, 1935 and 1940: White, D. William "The American Hospital Industry Since 1900: A Short 
History" Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, Vol. 3, (1982) p 143-170.  1946-2000: 
American Hospital Association, Hospital Statistics  (Various Years). 
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The 45o line represents a situation in which the size distribution of nonprofit and for-
profit hospital is identical.  
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I illustrate the change over time in the relative size of nonprofit and for-profit providers 
by using three curves: for 1970, 1982 and 1998. A point on any of these contours 
corresponds to a pair of percentile points for an identical hospital’s capacity. For 
example, the pair (0.5, 0.2) on the 1970 curve means that a hospital in the 50th percentile 
of the for-profit size-distribution had the same number of beds as a hospital in the 20th 
percentile of the nonprofit size-distribution. By 1998, the median for-profit hospital 
utilized the same number of beds as a hospital in the 43rd percentile of the nonprofit size-
distribution. It is clear from Figure 2.2 that for-profit hospitals moved trough the size-
distribution of the nonprofit hospitals. As a matter of fact, in 1998 for-profit hospitals in 
the 25th percentile and below were larger than their nonprofit counterparts.  
 
Figure 2.2 
Percentile Nonprofit – Percentile For-Profit graph for capacity in 1970, 1982 and 1998. 
Percentile FP
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The current section is divided into three subsections: the first provides a historical outline 
description of the era before and after the introduction of the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.  The roots that hospitals have as charitable institutions still have overwhelming 
impact on policy interventions as well as for the formulation of theories. Understanding 
the historical evolution of the hospital sector is important for recognizing the effects that 
different regulatory, economic, technological and demographic changes had on the 
relative share and size of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. The second subsection 
discusses the determinants of hospitals’ capacity choice, namely, number of admissions, 
lengths of stay and occupancy rates. Using aggregate hospital data for the U.S. between 
1960 and 2000, I show that although most of the convergence in capacity is replicated by 
the convergence in the number of admissions, medical practice, represented by average 
length of stay, contributed to the growing similarity between nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals. Finally, using hospital-level data for the U.S. between 1970 and 1998, I present 
a decomposition analysis of the principal components of the convergence process. 
 
2.1 The History of the US hospital market 
2.1.1 The pre-Medicare era  
In 1752, Pennsylvania Hospital was the first hospital to be established in the U.S.  It was 
a hospital, intended to serve all of the sick poor who suffered from a curable, non-
contagious illness. At that time, paying patients accounted for 22% of admissions (Raffel 
and Raffel, 1989).5 Following Philadelphia, similar voluntary hospitals were built in New 
York and Boston. All these hospitals relied for their operation on paying patients beside 
donations and support from the state.6 The U.S. Bureau of Education recorded the 
existence of 178 hospitals, of all types, in 1873. “Hospitals existed in the nineteenth 
century to fulfill a social function, rather than a medical one” (White, 1982) as it was 
only the poorest members of society that used the hospital. Hospitals were also used for 
teaching and research purposes; hence one might view the indigent patients as paying for 
                                                 
5 “Paying patients were usually servants or slaves whose masters paid the bills or mentally ill from middle-
and-upper-class families” (Raffel and Raffel, 1989). 
 
6 “Paying patients were often charged more than the cost of care, and the excess money helped to support 
the free patients” (Raffel and Raffel, 1989). 
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medical services by allowing the use of their bodies for medical training purposes (Raffel 
and Raffel, 1989). 
 
Major medical developments have altered the original role of hospitals; from the last 
resort for the sick and poor to the superior organizational form, in both diagnosis and 
treatment, for all members of society. The number of hospitals reached 4,041 in 1925, 
more than 20 times the number of hospitals in 1873. The hospital of the twentieth 
century, regardless of its ownership status, was a business that focuses on delivering high 
quality medical care to all patients. As a result of this orientation, the nonprofit hospital 
attracts patients who are willing and able to pay for its services, utilizes the most 
advanced technologies and employs leading physicians and other highly skilled workers. 
Yet, the roots that so many nonprofit hospitals have as charitable institutions may tilt our 
reasoning for their current existence towards somewhat anachronistic and outdated 
arguments. Such arguments often rely on the notion that nonprofit providers are altruistic 
in nature while for-profit providers engage in profit-seeking and even compassionless 
behavior.  
 
In 1928, the share of for-profit hospitals was 43.6%, similar to the share of nonprofit 
hospitals in that year (43.9%) and the reminder was accounted for by government 
hospitals. White (1982) suggested that for-profit hospitals played an important role in the 
early growth of the industry. These hospitals were small proprietary institutions, owned 
by doctors who wanted to provide facilities for themselves and for the community (Gray, 
1991). This type of hospital gradually disappeared throughout the century; by 1965 its 
share has declined to 15%. For-profit hospitals in small communities and rural areas were 
often replaced by nonprofit hospitals, or even changed their ownership status to the 
nonprofit form directly.  
 
Why was nonprofit status preferred to for-profit status at a time when demand for 
medical care was increasing and third-party insurance was becoming well established? 
Following the years of the Great Depression and World War II, the government held the 
view that there was shortage of hospital beds. Beginning in 1946, the government 
encouraged hospital construction through the Hill-Burton Act. For-Profit hospitals were 
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not allowed to obtain such funds. Nonprofit hospitals receiving nearly 60 percent of all 
funds (Wu, 1992) placed for-profit hospitals at great disadvantage.7 Between the first 
Hill-Burton award in 1947 and the early 1970s, more than 344 thousand inpatient beds 
were added to public and nonprofit general hospitals. Hill-Burton funds exceed 3.7 
billion dollars.8 Dranove (2000) describes how “many communities took over their local 
for-profit hospital, converted them to nonprofit status, and infused much needed cash into 
aging facilities”.  The Hill-Burton Act of 1946 was the first major entry of the federal 
government into supporting the general medical care system. The Medicare and Medicaid 
programs of 1965 can be viewed as a significant expansion of this involvement. Yet, 
while Medicare and Medicaid were primarily aimed to improve access to medical care 
for the aged and the poor, these programs also marked the beginning of a more symmetric 
treatment of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals on the part of the government. The two 
programs reimbursed for-profit as well as nonprofit hospitals. This has reduced the 
financial risk of running for-profit hospitals and for the first time since the early 1950s 
the number of beds in for profit hospital began to increase (White, 1982). 
 
2.1.2 The post-1965 era 
The need to provide medical care by public and nonprofit hospitals, in the form of free or 
subsidized services was overwhelmingly lessened as the government began subsidizing 
purchases of medical care directly through programs like Medicare and Medicaid (White, 
1979). Medicare paid hospitals on a cost-plus basis, a method that did not encourage 
hospitals to operate efficiently. Most private insurance plans paid whatever charges 
hospitals billed. As a result, the cost of Medicare continued to rise rapidly and the 
government had to step in. Legal limitations, requiring hospitals to have government 
approval (in advance) for the purchase of major equipment, the expansion of existing 
medical facilities and the construction of new ones through certificate of need (CON) 
                                                 
7 White (1982) mentions a study suggesting that the Hill-Burton Act may have contributed to the decline of 
for-profit hospitals over the 1950s and 1960s. 
 
8 “The Hill-Burton program assisted in the construction of nearly 40 percent of beds in the nation’s short-
term general hospitals and was the single greatest factor in the increase in the nation’s bed supply during 
the 1950s and 1960s” (Haglund and Dowling, 1993). 
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rules.9 In 1983, a fundamental change to the hospitals’ environment took place - the 
introduction of the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). Prior to the PPS, 
government programs reimbursed hospitals on a cost basis, whereby hospitals were paid 
retrospectively based on their reported costs. Under the new system, hospitals were 
reimbursed on the basis of a fixed payment per patient. This payment was independent of 
the actual cost incurred and depended on the diagnosis of the patient at the time of 
admission.10 Gray (1991) calls this period the end of the golden era as the 
“reimbursement environment from the late 1960s until the early 1980s made it difficult 
not to make money operating hospitals, so long as they were located away from 
concentrations of low-income populations and in states that did not regulate hospital 
income.” In the late 1960s, while the decline in the number of proprietary hospitals 
continued, a new type of for-profit hospital has emerged - the Investor-Owned Hospital 
Company. In 1984, close to 60 percent of all investor-owned hospitals were owned by 
only six hospital chains.11  
Hospitals reacted to the PPS by limiting services – curtailing lengths of stay, reducing 
inpatient testing, and laying off staff. The new system has been successful in containing 
hospital costs, and for the first time in the history of Medicare, the number of Medicare 
admissions declined (Raffel and Raffel, 1989). Although hospitals changed their behavior 
rather radically, the convergence trend, presented in Figure 2.1, was not disrupted by the 
introduction of the PPS. However, the reasons for the continued convergence process 
changed. 
  
Table 2.1 illustrates the change in the underling causes of the convergence process. Prior 
to the introduction of the PPS in the early 1980s, both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals 
                                                 
9 Phelps (1997) argues that, based on the empirical studies of CON laws, such regulations were generally 
inefficient in controlling hospital cost and possibly had perverse effects on overall cost, as hospitals 
substituted away from beds to other costly inputs such as equipment and personnel. 
 
10 Payments under PPS were made at a predetermined, specific rate for each discharge according to its 
classification in one of 467 diagnostic related groups (DRGs). 
 
11 Gray (1991) provides the following information regarding those six hospitals: Hospital Corporation of 
America (200 hospitals), American Medical International (115 hospitals), Humana (87 hospitals), national 
Medical Enterprises (47 hospitals), Charter Medical Corporation (41 hospitals), and Republic Health 
Corporation (24 hospitals).  
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grew in scale. For-profit hospitals grew at a rate of more than 5 percent per year, whereas 
nonprofit hospitals grew at about 2.3 percent per year, leading to convergence in size. 
 
Table 2.1: Growth rate of the average number of beds per hospital, by 
ownership type: 1955 – 2000. (percent) 
 
Year Nonprofit For-Profit Government 
1955-1960 7.9 19.2 -2.3 
1960-1965 10.9 26.9 -0.5 
1965-1970 16.3 25.7 -2.8 
1970-1975 12.7 36.7 -0.3 
1975-1980 5.7 26.5 -0.9 
1980-1985 1.3 8.4 1.4 
1985-1990 -2.5 4.4 -2.3 
1990-1995 -4.2 4.5 -0.1 
1995-2000 -1.6 4.2 -3.2 
Source: American Hospital Association, Hospital Statistics (Various Years), 
author’s calculations. 
 
After the introduction of PPS, for-profit hospitals continued to grow, albeit at a markedly 
lower rate. Nonprofit hospitals, on the other hand, contracted. Government hospitals, 
throughout most of the period, experienced a modest decline in average size. The decline 
in size is mainly attributable to the changing role of government, as subsidizing medical 
care gradually supplanted the production of hospital services. Government hospitals were 
not sensitive to changes in federal or state programs.12 
By and large, changes in the economic environment induced the convergence in size 
between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. Some changes, such as aging, population 
growth, crowding out of government hospitals and symmetric reimbursement on the part 
of public programs have led both ownership types to experience growth in their efficient 
scale, potentially at different rates. At the same time, changes such as a decline in federal 
subsidies (which favored nonprofit hospitals), increasing consolidation and challenges by 
local government and communities to the tax-exemptions received by nonprofit hospitals 
have led to a simultaneous decrease in the size of nonprofit hospitals and increase in the 
                                                 
12 Duggan (2000) finds evidence to support the claim that public hospitals differ substantially from all 
private hospitals (for-profit or nonprofit) because of their soft budget constraint. 
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size of for-profit hospitals. In the next subsection I study the underling determinants of 
the changes in relative size of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.  
 
2.2 The Determinants of Capacity 
A hospital’s capacity expresses the choice of its potential to accommodate patients. Yet, 
maintaining unutilized capacity is costly and therefore, hospitals that experience a decline 
in occupancy rates have an incentive to reduce their space. Consider the following 
identity:  
 
(2.1) ALSAdmOccBed ⋅≡⋅  
 
Where Bed is the number of beds per hospital; Occ is the hospital’s occupancy rate; Adm 
is its average number of admissions per day and ALS is its average length of stay (in 
days). The right hand side of (2.1) highlights the fact that hospital beds can be either 
vacant or occupied while the left hand side illustrates that a bed cannot concurrently 
accommodate a new admission (patient admitted that day) and one admitted during 
previous days. In other words, hospitals face a tradeoff between admissions volume and 
hospitalization duration. For example, doubling the number of admissions, while cutting 
lengths of stay in half, will not affect overall utilization. Note that, volume and duration 
are perfect substitutes in terms of utilized capacity or patient days; however, they are 
imperfect substitutes in terms of economic or medical performance13.  
The identity in (2.1) holds for each individual hospital and subsequently holds for any 
aggregation across hospitals. Equations (2.2) and (2.3) present these identities for the 
average nonprofit and for-profit hospitals respectively. 
 
(2.2) NNNN ALSAdmOccBed ⋅≡⋅  
(2.3) FFFF ALSAdmOccBed ⋅≡⋅  
 
Divide equation (2.2) by equation (2.3) and rearrange terms, to get: 
 (2.4) 
1−



⋅⋅=≡ F
N
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N
F
N
F
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ALS
ALS
Adm
Adm
Bed
Bed
Ratio
Size
 
                                                 
13 For example, under the prospective payment system hospitals have an economic incentive to increase the 
number of admissions and cut the length of stay per admission. On the other hand, shortening the lengths of 
stay might not be medically desired, and can damage the hospital’s reputation.   
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The nonprofit-to-for-profit size ratio, presented in equation (2.4), is the product of three 
ratios: the admissions ratio, the ALS (average length of stay) ratio and the inverse 
vacancy ratio. To identify the individual contribution of each component, define 
FNFN iii // =  where, ],,,[ ALSAdmOccBedi ∈  and apply a log transformation to both 
sides of (2.4): 
 
(2.5) FNFNFNFN OccALSAdmBed //// lnlnlnln −+=  
 
Totally differentiating (2.5) and dividing both sides by dlnBed, we get: 
 
(2.6) FN
FN
FN
FN
FN
FN
Bedd
Occd
Bedd
ALSd
Bedd
Admd
/
/
/
/
/
/
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln
ln1 −+=  
 
Applying equation (2.6), using aggregate data for the US between 1960 and 2000, I find 
that 82.2% of the convergence in size is attributed to a convergence in the number of 
admissions while 17.1% is accounted for by a convergence in lengths of stay. The 
contribution of the inverse vacancy ratio to the overall convergence is very small (less 
than 1%).  
An alternative approach to identify the apparatus of the convergence in capacity directly 
utilizes equation (2.4). The method, presented in Figure 2.3, shows three trend lines, all 
begin with the size ratio in 1960. The bottom contour illustrates the convergence in size, 
and hence combines all three effects: admissions, ALS and vacancy. In the middle 
contour the average length of stay ratio is normalized to one, allowing the dynamics in 
the admissions ratio and inverse vacancy ratio to exclusively determine the size ratio. The 
upper trend line depicts a hypothetical movement of the size ratio allowing it to be 
determined solely by changes in the inverse vacancy ratio.  
 
The area between the upper and the middle contours represent the contribution of the 
admissions ratio to the convergence in capacity, whereas the area between the middle and 
the bottom contours represent the contribution of the average length of stay ratio to the 
convergence in capacity. 
The convergence in capacity is mirrored by the convergence in utilization, though at a 
slower rate: While in 1960, a nonprofit hospital admitted on average 2.8 times more 
patients per hospital than a for-profit hospital, by 2000 that figure had fallen to 1.47. 
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To understand why nonprofit and for-profit hospitals converged faster in terms of 
capacity, measured here by the average number of beds, than in terms of utilization, as 
indicated by the annual number of admissions, recall the relationship between a hospital’s 
number of admissions and its number of beds, presented in equation 2.1: two factors may 
account for the differential speed of convergence in hospital size and admissions volume. 
First, both types of hospitals experienced a decline in occupancy rates from about 75% in 
the 1960s to about 60% in 2000. However, by 2000, unutilized capacity across ownership 
Figure 2.3 
The relative contribution of admissions, ALS and vacancy rates to the change in 
the nonprofit-for-profit size ratio, 1960 – 2000.
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types had a modest contribution to the overall convergence in size.14 Second, while the 
average length of stay in both types of hospitals has generally declined due to 
technological progress, which allowed for more effective interventions and thus resulted 
in shorter hospital stays, the average length of stay in for-profit hospitals declined at a 
slower rate than in nonprofit hospitals. One plausible explanation is the growing 
similarity in patient mix, due to the growing share of Medicare and Medicaid patients in 
for-profit institutions. These patients typically stay longer in the hospital. This trend 
partially offset the decline in ALS caused by technological improvements. 
  
2.3 Decomposition of the change in ratios 
The convergence in size between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals may arise from many 
different sources, including entry of new facilities, closures, mergers, expansion or 
downsizing of existing facilities, and changes in ownership15. These channels, through 
which the convergence took place, are in turn affected by laws and frequently regulated 
by government agencies.16 This subsection aims to uncover the principal sources 
responsible for the convergence trend and hope to serve as a guide for constructing a 
realistic model that can replicate the observed dynamics.   
 
In particular, to identify whether the change in ownership-specific average hospital size 
can be accounted for primarily by a change in the size of the staying hospitals (intensive 
margin) or by entry, exit, acquisitions and divestitures (extensive margin) hospital-level 
panel data for 1970-1998 are divided into seven time intervals; 1970-1974, 1974-1978, 
1978-1982, 1982-1986, 1986-1990, 1990-1994 and 1994-1998. The four-year interval 
                                                 
14  The over all change is less than 1%; however, the inverse vacancy ratio fluctuated during this 50-years 
period, this can be seen in Figure 2.3. 
 
15 Mitchell et al. (2001) find that AHA hospital data are often incomplete and inaccurate with regard to 
mergers and affiliations. Affiliations are not introduced as a separate channel in my analysis. In addition, in 
most cases, the individual hospital facilities involved in mergers continue to report separately to the AHA 
(Barro, 2000). 
 
16 For instance, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission monitor and sanction mergers 
and other forms of strategic behavior among hospitals; the states’ attorneys general oversee conversions 
and acquisitions of nonprofit hospitals; certificate-of-need laws limit entry of new hospitals and expansions 
of existing ones; state legislators frequently evaluate the cost of tax exempting nonprofit hospitals; and 
states and the federal government introduce programs to improve accessibility, insure certain groups and 
finance research activities.   
 16
data rather than year-to-year data are used to allow potential and actual hospitals to adjust 
their capacity (measured by number of beds). In order to identify the principal 
components of the ratio of average size of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, it is useful to 
partition the hospital sample into the following five mutually exclusive categories: (1) 
constant-status hospitals: general hospitals (including small/rural and teaching hospitals) 
that maintained their ownership type throughout a given time interval. (2) exitors: 
hospitals that exited the market prior to the end of a given time interval. (3) entrants: 
hospitals that entered the market after the beginning of a given time interval. (4) switched 
into: hospitals that switched from government or nonprofit status to for-profit status after 
the beginning of a given time interval. (5) switched from: hospitals that no longer 
maintained for-profit status by the end of a given time interval.  
 
A given time interval is indexed by a pair of years (j,i), where j represent the first year 
and i the last year of a given time interval. For any given pair (j,i), each hospital will 
belong to one of the five, mutually exclusive, categories, k, listed above. Denote the share 
of hospitals with ownership type [ ]FNo ,∈ , group k in year i as Oiks , and the average size 
of hospitals of ownership type [ ]FNo ,∈ , group k and year i as Oikx . The staying hospital 
category is marked k=1. The average size (measured by number of beds) of hospital type 
o in year i, is: ∑
k
O
ik
O
ik xs . Define the nonprofit to for-profit size ratio, in year i, as 
∑∑=
k
F
ik
F
ik
k
N
ik
N
iki xsxsR . Furthermore, denote the growth rate, within a given time 
interval, for ownership type o, as: ∑∑=
k
O
jk
O
jk
k
O
ik
O
ik
O
ji xsxsG . 
 
Using growth rate for nonprofit hospitals, the change in this ratio as we move from year j 
to year i, is given by: 
(2.7)  ∑
∑∑ −
=−=∆
k
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ik
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By rearranging this expression around the staying hospitals category, we get: 17  
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The “within” component  The “between” component 
   
The staying for-profit hospitals category serves as a cross-sectional reference group 
whereas all nonprofit hospitals serve as a reference group for the time dimension. It is 
important to realize that such decomposition considers for-profit and nonprofit hospitals 
simultaneously; yet, the resulting decomposition of effects is not unique.18 The “within” 
component, represents intensive margin changes, and focuses on the staying hospitals 
group (k=1). The sign of the “within” component is determined by the sign of 
F
i
F
j
N
ji xxG 11 − .19 If the staying for-profit hospitals were to grew at the same rate as all 
nonprofit hospitals, the within component would equal zero. Intuitively, similar growth 
rates in size for both for-profits and nonprofits hospital, even of large magnitude, will 
have little or no effect on the ratio of sizes.20  
 
Table 2.2 presents the results from the decomposition given by equation (2.8) for the 
seven time periods. The bottom row – Total - lists the percentage decline in the nonprofit-
to-for-profit size ratio for each time segment and is the sum of the effects of each of the 
                                                 
17 See appendix 2.A for the derivation.  
 
18 For example, by using the staying nonprofit hospital as cross sectional reference group and for-profit 
hospitals as reference group for the time dimension a different decomposition would emerge. When 
decomposing differences, it is common to take an average of such two polar decompositions (viewed as 
lower and upper bounds). This is not the case when decomposing ratios, as it treats both for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals simultaneously. Therefore it can be viewed as the choice of an angle trough which one 
studies a phenomenon, rather than the choice of upper or lower bounds. 
  
19 The average size of a staying for-profit hospital in year i is subtracted from average size of a staying for-
profit hospital in year j, multiplied by the growth rate of all nonprofit hospitals. 
 
20 Note that the nonprofit hospitals growth rate is used as multiplier in the case of exitors, and hospitals 
switching from for-profit status, as these hospitals appear only in the starting period, j, but are absent in the 
end period, i. 
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five categories. Components with negative sign contribute to the convergence trend, 
whereas components with positive sign exacerbate the differential between for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals. 
 
Table 2.2: Decomposition of the change in nonprofit-to-for-profit average size ratio. 
 
Category 70 - 74 74 – 78 78 - 82 82 - 86 86 - 90 90 - 94 94 – 98 
Stayers -0.8 -1.0 -3.3 -4.5 0.6 -0.3 -0.7 
Exitors -7.2 -6.7 -4.0 -4.7 -5.7 -1.3 -1.4 
Entrants -5.9 -2.3 0.5 0.8 -0.9 -1.2 -1.0 
Switch into -1.0 -0.3 2.9 2.5 1.8 -1.6 -3.6 
Switch from 0.1 -1.3 -0.8 -1.2 -3.1 -2.3 -1.0 
Total -14.9 -11.6 -4.7 -7.1 -7.3 -6.7 -7.7 
 
In the 1970-1978 period, most of the dynamics is accounted for by for-profit exitors and 
entrants, which account for 88% of the convergence trend in the 1970-1974 period and 
78% of the convergence trend in the 1974-1978 period. This finding corresponds to the 
gradual disappearance of small proprietary hospitals coupled with the emerging of large 
investor-owned hospitals (Gray, 1991). Conversion of ownership status played a minor 
role at that period. The capacity increase of nonprofit hospitals did not lag behind those 
of staying for-profit hospitals, leading to a small positive effect of the staying category on 
the convergence trend.  
In the 1978-1986 period, the staying category explains about half of the convergence 
trend. While staying for-profit hospitals maintained their size throughout the period, it 
was the nonprofit hospitals that experienced a major slowdown in capacity growth 
followed by a switch to negative growth. The continued exit of small proprietary 
hospitals accounts for the other half. This period also highlights another important 
feature, the conversion of government hospital to both for-profit and nonprofit status. 
Those government hospitals that chose for-profit status were smaller on average than the 
typical for-profit hospital, creating an offsetting effect on convergence. Wu (1992) who 
studied this period claims that government hospitals account for nearly 50 percent of all 
hospitals that changed ownership status. At the same time, government hospitals that 
were privatized were more likely to switch to nonprofit status.21 
                                                 
21 Government hospitals that choose a nonprofit status were also smaller on average than the typical 
nonprofit hospital, which stimulated the convergence process. The overall effect is likely to support the 
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In the 1986-1998 period, the capacity of both staying for-profit hospitals and nonprofit 
hospitals decreased. As both moved in the same direction with similar proportions the 
effect of the staying category on the convergence trend was small. In fact, the staying for-
profit category for the 1986-1990 period was slightly offsetting the convergence trend, as 
existing for-profit hospital lowered their capacity faster than nonprofit hospitals. This 
finding corresponds to new empirical research by Hansmann et al. (2002) who suggest 
that “nonprofit firms have a tendency to act as capital traps, in which capital remains 
inefficiently embedded over long periods”. By studying the 1985-1994 period, the 
authors find that for-profit hospitals are the most responsive to reductions in demand. In 
the 1990s, all categories positively contributed to the convergence trend, yet, switches in 
ownership types through mergers, acquisitions and divestitures accounted for 58% of the 
trend in the 1990-1994 period, and 60% in the 1994-1998 period. The reminder is 
explained by entry, exit and intensive margins changes, all operating in the same 
direction.  
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convergence process as government-to-nonprofit switches were more pronounced than government-to-for-
profit switches.  
Figure 2.4 
Decomposition of the change in nonprofit-to-for-profit average size ratio 
Overall trend 
Stayers 
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Figure 2.4 presents a graphical illustration that corresponds to table 2.2. The categories 
exitors and switch from were combined into one category, representing hospitals that left 
the pool of for-profit hospitals. In order to represent hospitals that entered the for-profit 
population, the categories entrants and switch into were combined.  
 
The continuous line represents the convergence in size, and is identical to the 1970-1998 
segment in Figure 2.1. For each four-year interval, the dotted line illustrates the contour 
of the convergence process, if it were to rely solely on intensive margins changes (i.e. 
changes to staying hospitals). The vertical distance between the starting point of each 
four-year interval and the convergence path measures the contribution of exitors and 
switchers-from to the convergence trend. The vertical distance between the end of each 
four-year interval and the convergence path measures the contribution of entrants and 
switchers-into to the convergence trend. When the dotted line is downward slopping and 
crosses the convergence path, all categories positively affect the convergence. 
Alternatively, when the dotted line lies below the convergence path, as in the 1978-1982 
and 1982-1986 periods, entry is said to offset the convergence trend.22  
 
3. Taxonomy of Economic Models of Nonprofit Firms  
There are several comprehensive surveys of the theoretical and empirical literature on 
nonprofit organizations. For example, James and Rose-Ackerman (1986) focused on 
theoretical justifications and models, which attempt to explain the existence of nonprofit 
organizations. Sloan (2000a) concentrates primarily on empirical research and provides 
an excellent survey of the empirical state of affairs. Malani et al. (2003) survey three 
alternative economic models of nonprofit organizations and point out where existing 
empirical evidence allow us to distinguish between these models.23 However, to my 
knowledge, none of the existing surveys attempt to cluster these different theories by 
considering their key attributes simultaneously. Such an attempt is made in this section as 
I classify various economic theories of nonprofit organizations around a taxonomic 
                                                 
22 See appendix 2.B for detailed illustrations. 
 
23 The three alternative economic models of nonprofit organizations in Malani et al. (2003) are: Lakdawalla 
and Philipson (1999), Pauly and Redisch (1973) and Glaeser and Shleifer (1998). 
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system. This taxonomy identifies the conceptual building blocks of these models, 
highlights their importance for the study of nonprofit organizations and offers a practical 
way to organize the various models. In addition, such classification will enable me to 
show how my theoretical approach relates to the literature.  
In order to obtain the suggested taxonomy I have combined two conceptually 
independent dimensions: an objective-choice dimension and a complete information-
incomplete information dimension. My choice of organizing dimensions is not unique, in 
fact, proposing different organizing dimensions can lead to a different taxonomy.24 
Nevertheless, I find the dimensions identified in this present taxonomy are very useful for 
organizing a wide range of theories of nonprofit organizations.   
 
The objective –choice dimension  
Ownership status, whether for-profit or nonprofit, represents a choice. For some, this 
choice can be traced back to intrinsic differences in objectives across individuals. For 
example, the altruist will choose to organize as a nonprofit while the opportunist will 
choose to organize as a for-profit. For others, the choice of ownership status need not rely 
on a-priori differences in objectives; it results from simply balancing the benefits and 
drawbacks of each status under a set of market conditions.  In the present taxonomy, the 
objective – choice dimension corresponds to these two polar viewpoints: a theory is 
classified as “objective” if it contains the assumption that nonprofit and for-profit firms 
differ in their objectives. Conversely, theories that rely on uniform objectives for both 
nonprofit and for-profit firms are classified as “choice”.25  
 
The complete information – incomplete information dimension 
In a landmark paper, Arrow (1963) emphasizes the role of uncertainty and incomplete 
markets for risk as candidate explanation for nonprofits’ dominance of the healthcare 
sector. The idea is that the hospital care purchaser is often not well informed about the 
                                                 
24 Alternative dimensions which might be included are: binding vs. non-binding non-distribution constraint, 
reduced-form vs. specific “residual claimant” for the nonprofit organization and so on. 
 
25 In many cases, scholars have put forward the idea that the nonprofit objectives mirror the objectives of a 
certain group within the organization (e.g. trustees, administrators, physicians) or outside the organization 
(e.g. consumers, government).  For the purpose of this taxonomy, unless the resulting objectives for the 
nonprofit entities match the for-profit ones, I will classify this theory as “objective”.  
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quality of the service being purchased and is frequently less informed than the supplier. 
Consequently, some scholars claim that the solution for this asymmetric information 
problem surface due to the availability of the nonprofit legal status. In this taxonomy, any 
theory that relies on incomplete information will be classified as such.  
 
Combining the two independent dimensions (i.e. the objective-choice dimension and the 
complete information-incomplete information dimension) yields four distinct classes of 
conceptualizations. Table 3.1 presents the taxonomy and organizes these approaches and 
identifies several well-established theories of nonprofit organizations. It is important to 
note that no attempt has been made to be exhaustive. Instead the theories identified and 
described are those that are frequently cited in other surveys. In what follows I will 
discuss each class of models separately.  
 
Table 3.1: Taxonomy of economic theories of nonprofit organizations  
with corresponding leading examples 
 
Complete Information – Incomplete Information Dimension Objective– 
Choice 
Dimension Complete information Incomplete information 
Choice  
Trust Signal 
Non Contactable Quality 
Mechanism for Consumer Control 
   
Objective 
Quality-Quantity Maximization 
Profit Deviators (or Altruists) 
Physicians’ Cooperative 
Demand for Collective Goods 
“For-Profits in Disguise” 
Government Favoritism 
 
The first class of models, shown at the lower left-hand side panel of table 3.1, present 
nonprofit organizations as maximizing objectives, such as patient volume, quality, 
physicians’ income or charity care. These models promoted the idea that when a firm is 
not organized with the explicit goal of maximizing profits, applying conventional 
neoclassical models of firms is not appropriate. Newhouse (1970) and Feldstein (1971) 
argue that nonprofit hospitals seek to maximize some combination of quantity and quality 
of services provided, subject to the constraint of maintaining fiscal viability (i.e. Quality-
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Quantity Maximization). Their models suggest that nonprofit hospitals have a bias against 
low-quality services. Lakdawalla and Philipson (1999) have generalized Newhouse’s 
model by including profits in the firm’s objective function. In their formulation, nonprofit 
firms are assumed to have non-pecuniary motives and enjoy a competitive advantage 
over profit-maximizing firms. The authors use the term Profit Deviators to describe the 
willingness of nonprofit firms to lower profits in order to provide more services. Lastly, 
Pauly and Redisch’s (1973) Physicians’ Cooperative model serves as an example for 
attributing the objectives of the nonprofit hospital to a certain group within the 
organization. In their model, the members of the physicians’ staff cooperatively manage 
the nonprofit hospital. Basing their modeling approach on the Labor-Managed-Firm 
(LMF) literature, Pauly and Redisch assume that the physicians’ staff maximizes their 
income per member.26 In other words, the group of attending physicians enjoys de facto 
control over the hospital by collectively controlling the utilization of inputs and the 
medical output.27  
 
The second class of models, shown at the upper right-hand side panel of table 3.1, traces 
the justification for nonprofit organizations to their alleged “trustworthiness” (Hansmann, 
1980). The nonprofit status is said to provide weaker incentive to shirk on quality when 
faced with asymmetric information, favoring the suppliers of care.28 This idea that 
nonprofit hospitals are more trustworthy has spurred a large body of theoretical literature 
(Hansmann, 1980, 1996; Easley and O’Hara, 1983; Hirth 1999; Glaeser and Shleifer, 
1998; Glaeser, 2003).  These models stress the idea that consumers cannot contract on 
product quality (Malani et al, 2003); this quality is for the most part unobservable.29 By 
                                                 
26 Bonin et al. (1993) wrote a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical LMF literature. Also 
see Ward (1958), Vanec (1970) and Meade (1972). 
 
27 From an historical viewpoint, true physicians’ cooperatives never developed in the United States (White, 
1982). Moreover, the LMF theory implies that nonprofit hospitals should be smaller than for-profit 
hospitals and an increase in the demand for hospital services may decrease the production of services 
through reducing the size of its medical staffs. Both these predictions are not applicable to the US hospital 
market. 
 
28 The idea is that the consumer often cannot experience the quality of the good. In other words, hospital 
care is credence good (Emons 1997). The consumer may never know for sure what would have happened if 
the service had not been performed or if it had been purchased from another seller.  
 
29 A profit-seeking hospital may provide high quality on easily monitored dimensions (e.g. amenities, 
meals, privacy), but cut corners on hard-to-monitor quality measures. 
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choosing a nonprofit status the organization commits itself to the provision of higher 
quality. It is the choice of nonprofit form that signals quality, thus referred to as a Trust 
Signal. Similarly, Ben-Ner and Gui (1993) rely on information asymmetries to rationalize 
the rise of nonprofit organizations as a mechanism for consumer control.  
All models in this category essentially predict that nonprofit organizations provide 
services of higher quality relative to their for-profit counterparts. However, rigorous and 
extensive empirical work has failed to detect such differences in quality (Frank and 
Salkever, 1994) and data is said to be inconclusive (Malani et al., 2003).30 In recent 
research, David and Malani (2003) examine nonprofit hospitals’ signaling behavior by 
tracking a sample of nonprofit hospitals’ Internet websites nationwide. They find that 
nonprofit hospitals’ websites (and in particular homepages) highlight many quality 
dimensions.31 However, about 87 percent of nonprofit hospitals did not mention their 
ownership status on their website’s homepage and about 58 percent did not mention it 
anywhere on their website. The authors claim that if the nonprofit status were indeed an 
important Trust Signal it would be costless to add this detail along with all the other 
quality-related superlatives.  
 
The third class of models, shown at the lower right-hand side panel of table 3.1, combines 
the notions of incomplete information and intrinsically different objectives across 
ownership types. James (1983) and Weisbrod (1975; 1988) loosely fit into this category. 
James (1983) relies on information asymmetries and variation in objectives to emphasize 
the role of government in channeling grants and subsidies to nonprofits rather than to 
public agencies or for-profit firms. Weisbrod (1975) assumes that the provision of 
collective and individual goods through the public sector will result in unsatisfied 
demand by some consumers. The greater this unsatisfied demand is and the greater the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
30 Herzlinger and Krasker (1987) find no differences in structural measures; Keeler et al. (1992) finds no 
differences in excess mortality and explicit process; Shortell and Hughes (1988) finds no differences in 
mortality; Sloan et al. (1998, 2000b) and Sloan and Taylor (1999) finds no differences in survival as well as 
functional and cognitive status; Geweke et al. (2001) found no difference in mortality from pneumonia 
among elderly population in south California. 
 
31 These webpages often include pictures of surgeons, babies and joyful patients coupled with words such 
as “state-of-the-art equipment”, “dedicated physicians”, “professionalism”, “commitment to high quality”, 
“teamwork”, “experience”, “integrity”, “consumer satisfaction” and so on. 
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heterogeneity in demand is, the larger the non-government sector would be. This 
emerging private sector will provide collective-consumption goods through the nonprofit 
sector and private goods through the for-profit sector. Finally, Weisbrod (1988) suggests 
that some nonprofit are in fact “For-Profits in Disguise”. Like wolves in sheep’s 
clothing, such firms enjoy the preferential treatment granted to nonprofits, yet ignore all 
community responsibilities. These profit-seeking entities choose to organize as nonprofit 
firms and for this reason, their objectives cannot be inferred from their choice of 
ownership status. Note that under this conceptualization, both differential objectives and 
incomplete information combine to explain the noteworthy number of ownership 
switches from nonprofit to for-profit status and vice-versa. 
 
In my view, the role that incomplete information has in crafting and preserving the 
nonprofit form is overstated. Asymmetric information, favoring suppliers is not a 
distinctive feature of the hospital industry while the dominance of private nonprofit 
hospitals is a rather unique phenomenon. Moreover, models that emphasize “objective” 
over “choice” tend to provide little insight for understanding the driving forces behind the 
growing similarity in managerial and medical practices. In the next section I develop a 
model in which firms have identical objectives but might differ in their ability to benefit 
from a given ownership form. In contrast to the existing literature, this approach relies on 
neither different ownership type-specific objectives nor incomplete information to 
generate an equilibrium in which both ownership types are chosen by a strictly positive 
fraction of hospitals. As a result, my theoretical approach belongs at the upper left-hand 
side panel and fills a conceptual void in this particular taxonomy.   
 
 
4. Theoretical Analysis 
The theoretical model in this section is intended to explore potential reasons for the large 
difference in size between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, by emphasizing the role that 
a choice of regulatory status has on the choice of capacity. In addition, the model aims to 
elucidate candidate explanations for the subsequent convergence in hospitals’ size, by 
focusing on the role of demographic trends, subsidies, local pressure and government 
behavior. 
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In this model, all hospitals are assumed to produce a homogeneous service. Patients and 
physicians do not favor one ownership type over the other; hence, service prices and 
wages are equal across ownership types.32 Formally, I use a reduced form analysis, in 
which all decisions; in both for-profit and nonprofit firms are made in accord with the 
wishes of the person or group in control of the organization, which I shall refer to as the 
owner.33 The owner has access to a common production technology and maximizes utility 
from monetary and non-monetary gains by choosing an ownership type (nonprofit status 
or for-profit status). Switching from one ownership type to another is assumed to be 
costless. In addition, if the owner chooses a nonprofit status, she will benefit from cost 
advantages and will be subject to a non-distribution constraint.  
 
Cost advantages: nonprofit hospitals benefit from tax-exemptions, government grants and 
access to tax-exempt capital financing.34 Hansmann (1987) finds that “tax exemption 
offers nonprofit firms a significant advantage in establishing market share vis-à-vis for-
profit firms offering similar services.” Debt has always been the most important source of 
capital for private hospitals (Institute of Medicine, 1986). Federal and state laws permit 
private nonprofit hospitals to issue tax-exempt bonds through local and state 
governments. This allows these hospitals to borrow money at substantially lower rates 
than offered by lending institutions, because bondholders need not pay taxes on the bond 
interest income.35 Formally, I model all the economic advantages of nonprofit firms 
trough access to lower capital prices.  
 
                                                 
32 Sloan and Steinwald (1980) find no difference in wage rates paid by hospitals of different ownership 
type, holding other factors constant. 
 
33 The use of a single “owner” is similar to the representative member of the physician staff in Pauly and 
Redisch (1973), the “manager” in Eckel and Steinberg (1993), the unified concept of investor/donor in 
Lakdawalla and Philipson (1998), the entrepreneur in Glaeser and Shleifer (1998), or the owner/patron in 
Malani, Philipson and David (2003). 
 
34 Arrow (1963) argues that “Departure from the profit motive is strikingly manifested by the 
overwhelming predominance of nonprofit over proprietary hospitals ….. The simplest explanation is that 
public and private subsidies decrease the cost to the patient in nonprofit hospitals.” 
 
35 Wu (1992) discusses the common perception that nonprofit firms have significant cost advantages over 
for-profit firms due to their ability to raise capital through the sale of tax-exempt bonds.  
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Non-distribution constraint: cash income for nonprofit firms is constrained to be zero.  
The owner can, however, draw non-cash income in the form of perquisites such as a 
luxurious office and a company car. In other words, nonprofit firms can modify the form 
in which they pay out profits, by converting monetary income into perks, or “dividends-
in-kind” (Pauly, 1987). Eckel and Steinberg (1993) point out that although the alleged 
purpose of the non-distribution constraint is to prevent excessive perks, it is difficult to 
enforce proscriptions against excessive non-cash benefits paid to managers. Ortmann and 
Schlesinger (2002) claim that there is little in the nonprofit regulatory status to reduce the 
treat of fraud.36 A key assumption made in this analysis is that the utility from cash is at 
least as high as the utility from perks.37 Define π as profit and δ as a parameter, bounded 
between zero and one. δπ represents the income that would provide the same level of 
utility as π dollars spent on perks. The owner of a for-profit firm derives utility from the 
firm’s profits, UFP = πFP. On the other hand, the utility for the nonprofit firm can be 
written as UNFP = δπNFP,  
 
Firms can take on one of three ownership types; private for-profit, private nonprofit or 
public/government. There are G government firms and N private firms, out of which n are 
for-profit firms and the remaining N-n, are nonprofit firms. All N+G firms in the 
economy are assumed to compete in quantities (Cournot competition). However, I treat 
the number of government firms and their quantity choices as given.  
Localized competition with relatively high barriers to entry, due to regulation, licensing 
and high setup costs is usually studied using models of imperfect competition, such as the 
Cournot model.38 Moreover, Health insurance, third-party payment (Wu, 1992) and 
physicians’ induced demand (Roemer, 1961; Fuchs, 1978) may lower patients’ sensitivity 
                                                 
36  The authors suggests that resources meant for a particular purpose might be misappropriate towards 
other purposes, typically self-serving ones. 
 
37 Here I assume that all perks can be purchased with cash. Note that once the firm has access to lower 
prices for certain goods or services than the individual employee has (e.g. the firm can often bargain for 
better insurance premium rates) we might have higher utility from perks relative to cash. Nevertheless, for-
profit firms can modify the form in which they pay out all or some of their profits. This allows for-profits to 
mimic the behavior of nonprofit firms whenever perks are superior to cash. 
 
38 Gaynor and Haas-Wilson (1999) argue that nonprofit hospitals will exercise market power if they can. 
Simpson and Shin (1998) argue that nonprofit hospitals may still exercise market power even if their 
primary objective is not to maximize managers’ profit.  
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to price. For example, Dranove and White (1999) argue that patients’ decisions about 
which hospital to use were based on convenience of access rather than price.39 Likewise, 
there is no conclusive empirical evidence indicating that nonprofit providers enjoy a price 
premium, that is, despite the attention that has been devoted to competition in quality in 
the literature (Philipson, 2000).40  
The symmetric properties of the Cournot model will entail that all firms with common 
ownership type choose the same output level. Define total industry output, Y, as; 
(4.1)  GNFPFP
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Where, ky  is the individual firm’s production level, ],,[ GNFPFPk ∈ .41 The inverse 
demand function is assumed to be linear and take the form YYp βα −=)( , where α and β 
are demand shifters and p is output price. A private firm Ni ∈  of ownership type k will 
maximize its profits by choosing kiy , .42 
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Denote the marginal cost for ownership type k as, '),,( k
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In the optimum two sets of first-order conditions are satisfied. As marginal cost varies by 
ownership type, we have n first-order conditions of the type: ', 0i FP FPY y Cα β β− − − =  
and, (N–n) first-order conditions of the type: ', 0i NFP NFPY y Cα β β− − − = . Summing the 
first-order conditions over all N private firms, imposing symmetry within ownership type 
and using the industry output definition in (4.1) we can rewrite the industry output as;43  
                                                 
39 “insured patients had little incentive to shop around for the best prices, enabling providers to set prices in 
excess of marginal costs.” (Dranove and White, 1999) 
 
40 Young and Desai (1999) examined 43 hospitals in Texas, Florida and California that switched from 
nonprofit to for-profit type between 1981 and 1995. They find virtually no effect on prices, uncompensated 
care or unprofitable services.  
  
41  FP = For-Profit, NFP = Nonprofit and G = Government. 
 
42 Note that both for-profit and nonprofit share a common objective function, as long as the utility function 
monotonically increases with profits. 
 
43 This is assuming an interior solution, that is, the difference in marginal costs across ownership types 
supports participation in production of all N firms. 
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Plugging (4.2) back into the first order conditions we get the output choice of for-profit 
and nonprofit firms. 
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In what follows I will assume, for simplicity, that the production function for the 
individual firm exhibits constant returns to scale.44 Nonprofit firms are assumed to have 
access to lower capital prices, NFPFP rr > .45 With constant returns to scale the difference in 
marginal costs across ownership-types, )( '' NFPFP CC − will be positive for any level of 
output and its magnitude will depend on both the difference in capital prices and the form 
of the production function (e.g. the capital intensity).46  
 
Since the output choice of for-profit firms is negatively related to the number of nonprofit 
firms while the output choice of nonprofit firms is positively related to the number of for-
profit firms, conversion from nonprofit status to for-profit status will lead to higher 
output levels for both types. However, from (4.2) we see that the total industry output is 
negatively related to the share of for-profit firms.47 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
44 The model’s predictions hold for increasing marginal costs under additional conditions regarding the 
share of for-profit firms and the ownership type-related supply elasticity (See appendix 4.A).  
 
45 This is also true for property tax exemptions. The lower capital price will affect efficiency by 
encouraging a shift in the input mix of nonprofit firms towards capital.  
 
46 For example, with Cobb-Douglas production function, aa LKy −= 1 , where K and L are the levels of 
capital and labor inputs. )(1'' aNFPaFPaNFPFP rrAwCC −=− − , where A is a constant, w is the wage rate and rk is 
the capital price for ownership type k. The cost advantage of choosing a nonprofit status increases in a. 
 
47  Although both all firms increase their scale (individual-firm effect) the mix of nonprofit and for-profit 
firms is changed (composition effect). Industry output falls with switching from nonprofit to for-profit 
status as the composition effects dominate the individual-firm effect. 
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Lemma 1: Regardless of the number of private firms in the economy, N, the production 
level in the government sector, GyG, or the presence of a non-distribution constraint, a 
nonprofit firm will produce more than a for-profit firm when tax exemptions/subsidies 
are non-zero.48  
 
The rationale is fairly simple; the nonprofit firm enjoys a competitive advantage in that it 
has lower production costs. It exploits this cost advantage by increasing production. As 
quantities are strategic substitutes, the choice of output by nonprofit firms in turn induces 
a reduction in output by for-profit firms.49 Subsidies and tax-exemptions for nonprofit 
firms increase their minimum efficient scale, and affect their choice of inputs mix. Since 
utility maximization corresponds to profit maximization, the non-distribution constraint 
does not play a role in the choice of capacity.50 
 
Figure 2.1 in section 2 documents the convergence in size between nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals by featuring the behavior over time of the nonprofit-to-for-profit size 
ratio. In this model, all firms with identical ownership-type choose the same level of 
output/capacity, so this ratio is simply;   
 
FP
NFP
y
y
Ry ≡  
In order to study the determinants of the convergence process, a definition of market 
equilibrium is needed. Changes to relative size affect the relative profitability and hence 
alter the incentives for choosing ownership type. Equations (4.5) and (4.6) below 
describe the profits of for-profit and nonprofit firms respectively.  
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48 For proof see Appendix 4.B. 
 
49 Another way to obtain the same result is by rearranging the first order condition, such that 
k
k C
s
Yp =


 + ε1)( where sk is the share of industry output produced by firm of ownership type k and ε is the 
demand elasticity. The nonprofit firms having lower marginal costs are expected to have higher share of 
industry output. 
 
50 In some models the non-distribution constraint is assumed to induce nonprofit firms to channel their 
surplus into additional output.  
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(4.6) 
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Nonprofit firms are bigger and generate more surplus, as profits equal one-half times 
output squared.51 This has to hold in equilibrium, since nonprofit firms turn the higher 
surplus into perks, and perks generates lower utility relative to cash. Utility from perks 
(as a nonprofit firm) has to be higher than the utility from cash (as a for-profit firm) for 
owners to choose a nonprofit status. 
 
4.1 Market Equilibrium 
The owner will choose a nonprofit status if and only if, UNFP = δπNFP > πFP = UFP. If all 
owners have identical δ, the condition above will either hold or fail for all potential 
owners. Mixed equilibrium is ruled out as all firms choose the same ownership status. 
Moreover, this implies a constant profit ratio, as the profit ratio equals the output ratio 
squared; the output ratio is also constant and equal ( ) 1−= δRy . 
 
In what follows, δ is allowed to vary across firms. One possible reason for such 
heterogeneity in δ might entail that some firms are better than others in transforming cash 
into perks. In fact, it is rather unlikely that δ would represent altruism, quantity 
preferences, or “empire building” motives because higher δ does not imply stronger 
tendency to substitute profits for quantity.52 Moreover, owners with different δs, who 
chose the nonprofit status, would produce identical levels of output.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 U.S. Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, 1998, reports that nonprofit hospitals were more 
profitable than for-profit hospitals between 1988 and 1990. 
 
52  Note that δ need not be a characteristic of firms’ objectives but rather of firms’ technology. James and 
Rose-Ackerman (1986) have recognized that “one immediate difficulty is that we have no self-evident 
objective function for the nonprofit organization …. and we are left to speculate on what its objective might 
be.”  However, heterogeneity in δ does not represent such speculation. 
For-Profit Nonprofit 
NFP
FP
π
π
N
nN −
N
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δ 
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Assuming δ is distributed uniformly between 0 and 1, the share of for-profit firms will be 
given by: 
(4.7) ( ) ( )Pr( ) ( )
( ) ( )
FP FP
NFP NFP
n nn Rp n
N n n
π πδ π π= ≤ = =  
The for-profit-to-nonprofit profit ratio, Rp(n), has to equal to the for-profit share, n/N, 
(out of all private hospitals). n/N is compact and convex, and Rp: n/N ? n/N a continuous 
function. Therefore Rp has a fixed point. The fixed point, E1 in Figure 4.1 represents the 
mixed ownership equilibrium, as it lies both on the 45o degree line (the cumulative 
distribution function of a uniform (0, 1)) and on the for-profit-to-nonprofit profit ratio 
function.  
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Figure 4.1 
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Also note that since 
2 3
2 3
( ) ( ) ( )0, 0, 0Rp n Rp n Rp n
n n n
∂ ∂ ∂> < =∂ ∂ ∂ and 0 (0) ( ) 1Rp Rp N< < <  
E1 is a unique equilibrium.  
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4.2 Comparative-Static Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to compare different equilibrium states that are associated 
with different values of exogenous variables. More specifically, in this section I study 
how conversion from nonprofit to for-profit status, demographic changes, changes in 
government subsidies and crowding out of government beds affect the convergence 
process. In order to study the convergence process, denote demand and supply shifters by 
s. The ratio of average sizes corresponds to the share of for-profit hospital in the 
following way: 
(4.8) 
1
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A shock that increases the profit-ratio, Rp(n) decreases the size-ratio, Ry(n) and would 
lead to a disequilibrium, as the incentive to become a for-profit firm increases. As a 
result, the share of for-profit firms, which is determined endogenously, increases until a 
new equilibrium level is attained. 
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Figure 4.2 
E1 
F1 
E2 Ry(s1,n) 
Ry(s2,n) 
Ry(s3,n) 
R 
R
  
N
n  
 
To illustrate this, we begin at point E1 in Figure 4.2, The initial shock is represented by a 
downward shift in Ry to point F1, followed by a shift along the new Ry(s2,n) function 
from F1 to E2, the new equilibrium level. 
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Since this is a comparative-static analysis, there is no additional insight with regard to the 
process of adjustment, as this is merely a comparison of two equilibrium states. The 
thicker line RR connects the different equilibrium points. In addition, the Ry(s,n) curves 
become flatter as they shift downwards. 
Net conversion from nonprofit to for-profit type plays an important role in clearing the 
ownership-market. The direction of the effect of switches form nonprofit to for-profit 
status on the growing similarity between the two types of firms is fully captured by the 
sign of the partial derivative of Ry with respect to the number of for-profit firms, n.53 
 
Lemma 2: Regardless of the number of private firms in the economy, N, the production 
level in the government sector, GyG, and the presence of a non-distribution constraint, 
conversion from nonprofit to for-profit status leads to convergence in size, when tax 
exemptions / subsidies are non-zero.54 
 
Following lemma 1, where I asserted that Ry>1, lemma 2 claims that ownership switches 
is one possible driving force behind the convergence in size. Furthermore, the second 
derivative of Ry with respect to n is positive, indicating that the convergence process 
slows as the share of for-profit firms increases.  
Note that even if the share of for-profit firms approaches 1, conversion cannot lead to full 
convergence, as 1
)(
))(1(
1lim '
''
>−−
−++=→
GFP
NFPFP
Nn GyC
CCNRy βα . 
 
In this formulation there are two potential demand shifters, α and β, the intercept and 
slope of the linear inverse demand function respectively.55 When α increases, demand 
shifts out and in turn induces higher levels of production in both for-profit and nonprofit 
firms. All firms have equal absolute change in capacity, yet for-profit firms will 
experience a higher percentage change, due to their relatively smaller scale.  
                                                 
53 The partial derivative of Ry with respect to the number of for-profit firms, n, holds, by definition, the 
number of private firms, N, constant. Therefore it represents switching of ownership type from nonprofit to 
for-profit on the margin. 
 
54  For proof see Appendix 4.C. 
 
55 If we think of a representative consumer, i with a demand function iy pα= − , and a resulting aggregate 
inverse demand function, p Yα β= − , α can represent the maximum willingness to pay of a typical 
individual and β would be one over total population. 
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In addition, when β decreases demand pivots upwards. If government hospitals are absent 
from the market (i.e. GyG=0) the effect of a change in β induces a proportional change in 
scale across ownership types and the size-ratio, Ry is unaffected. However, when 
government hospitals are present in the market, and are less sensitive to shocks relative to 
their private counterparts, a decrease in β does lead to convergence in capacity.56 
 
Moreover, a negative supply shock represented by a decrease in the total number of 
public beds, GyG, will have similar effects on convergence as an increase in α. It will lead 
to equal absolute increase in the number of beds for both types and will result in 
convergence (Ry would shift down, as in Figure 4.2).57 A negative supply shock to the 
government providers would have similar properties as a positive demand shock.  
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Likewise, when the number of private firms, N, increases the profit-ratio, Rp, shifts 
downwards, subsequently, the share of for-profit firms falls and the size-ratio expands. In 
other words, exit stimulates the growing similarity in size. Markets with fewer hospitals 
would tend to have a lower share of nonprofit hospitals. In such markets, differences in 
capacity across ownership types are minimal. This result coincides with Lakdawalla and 
Philipson’s (1999) model, in which “the share of nonprofit firms rises with the number of 
firms in the industry.” In both formulations, entry reduces the relative attractiveness of 
the for-profit status.  
 
Finally, when cost advantages of nonprofit firms decrease, due to lower availability of 
government funds and subsidies, for-profit firms and non-profit firms experience 
converge in size. However, for this particular shifter, the effects on the scale of for-profit 
firms will be positive whereas the effect on the scale of nonprofit firms would be 
negative. Going back to table 2.1, it might be the case that different shifters played 
different roles before and after the introduction of the Prospective Payment System. 
                                                 
56 For empirical discussion of this feature see Section 5.2.2 and Appendix 5.D. 
 
57 It is worth noting that the effect on Ry comes from public beds per capita, βGyG, pointing out that it is the 
relevant component for the econometric evaluation of this model.   
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The model presented in this section stresses the cost advantages of nonprofit firms, and 
the constraints these firms face in term of paying out profits, as the key trade-off 
determining the mixed-ownership equilibrium. This simple model appears to be flexible 
enough to account for the static differences between for-profits and nonprofits, as well as 
the dynamics of the convergence in capacity. The model allows different potential 
shifters to shape the convergence trend, in ways that correspond to both the period prior 
to the introduction of the PPS and successive periods. In what follows, I turn to a 
discussion of yet another potential driving force behind the growing similarity in capacity 
- the pressure on nonprofit hospitals to provide community benefits. This pressure will be 
excessive when industry-wide effects due to ownership composition are ignored.  
 
4.3 Modeling quid-pro-quo pressure on nonprofit hospitals 
Originally, tax exemptions for nonprofit hospitals were justified by a “bargain” that was 
“struck between the hospital and the community: a hospital would treat patients who 
were unable to pay, and the government would grant a tax exemption to the hospital” 
(Pellegrini, 1989). The exemption for charitable organizations is a derivative of the 
concept that they perform functions, which, in the organizations' absence, government 
would have to perform; therefore, government is willing to forego the otherwise tax 
revenues in return for the public services rendered. However, faced with a growing trend 
of organizational similarity scholars have asked whether nonprofit ownership matters for 
a community’s interests and whether that justifies preferential treatment by policy 
makers.58, 59 Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice have 
challenged, since the early eighties, a large number of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals 
mergers, treating the nonprofit status as having similar propensity to exercise market 
power (Vaughn, 1999).60 Furthermore, a perception that nonprofit hospitals have replaced 
                                                 
58 See, Gray (1997), Keeler et al. (1999), Nicholson et al. (2000), Reinhardt (2000), Wilkicki (2001) and 
Young et al. (2000). 
 
59 A hospital losing its tax exempt status would be subject to corporate income tax; its contributions would 
be nondeductible for the donor; the basis of the hospital’s assets would be reduced for depreciation that 
would have been claimed had the hospital been a taxable corporation; and the hospital would lose access to 
new tax-exempt financing. Currently, the only sanction available to the IRS is complete revocation of a 
hospital’s tax-exempt status – a drastic step the IRS seldom takes. (Kuchler, 1992) 
 
60 “Confidence in the benevolence of nonprofits is likely to backfire, leaving communities across the 
country with a large profitable hospital that acts contrary to the best interest of consumers” (Vaughn, 1999) 
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their community service orientation with a commercial one has fueled the debate over the 
tax-exempt status that these hospitals enjoy.61 In particular, local, state, and federal 
governments eager to increase tax revenues and lobby groups representing the investor-
owned healthcare industry have put pressure on nonprofit hospitals to justify their tax 
exemptions (Gray, 1992).62, 63 
 
The nature of local competition is crucial, in my view, for assessing the true contribution 
of nonprofit hospitals to their communities.64 David and Helmchen (2003) claim that the 
focus on the individual hospital is misleading and, in some cases, may lead policymakers 
to support interventions that may decrease welfare. The view taken in this paper is of 
mixed-ownership equilibrium where low cost (nonprofit) hospitals coexist with high cost 
(for-profit) hospitals. Conversion from nonprofit to for-profit status (replacing a low cost 
hospital by a high cost one) leads to lower consumer surplus, viewed here as the primary 
component of community benefits. By requiring nonprofit hospitals to appropriate a 
fraction of their surplus towards activities labeled as community benefits local 
governments implicitly impose a tax on these hospitals.65  
 
Now assume that communities and local governments can tie tax-exemptions to measures 
of community benefits (e.g. charity care, losses from serving public program enrollees, 
losses from subsidizing necessary community services, net cost of research and 
education, and the like) by creating, what I call, quid-pro-quo pressure (QPQP) on 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
61 According to Eckels and Trocchio (1992), a growing number of community members, legislators, and 
policymakers are questioning whether hospitals are driven more by financial concerns and competitive 
forces than by a mission to respond to community needs. 
 
62  According to Kuchler (1992), State and local governments, often prompted by revenue shortfalls, have 
repeatedly raised challenges to hospitals’ exemption from property and other taxes. This, no doubt, creates 
pressure on nonprofit firms to allocate part of their surplus to these activities, labeled as community 
benefits, in order to maintain their tax status. 
 
63  In 1988, Judge Robert Young required St. Luke’s hospital and all other Lehigh County (Pennsylvania) 
hospitals to provide uncompensated care equal to at least 75 percent of their preceding year’s profits. Later 
on St. Luke’s property tax-exempt status was revoked, suggesting that payments in lieu of taxes were 
passed on to patients. 
 
64 The revocation of a tax exemption will not only alters the tax payments and provision of community 
benefits by the hospital under study, but may also prompt its competitors to modify their own behavior. 
 
65  Kuchler (1992) argues that such requirements increases the attractiveness of the for-profit status and in 
turn leads to more such conversions. 
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nonprofit hospitals. This practice is also widespread for access to capital financing.66 The 
government appears to both promote and mistrust nonprofit organizations in the 
healthcare sector (Frank and Salkever, 1994).  
 
Formally, I assume that a planner can choose a fraction of surplus x to be appropriated 
towards these community benefits. Consequently, the equilibrium condition in equation 
(4.7) can be rewritten as follows: 
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Note that x has no direct effect on the ability to generate surplus, yet it has an effect on 
the way in which this surplus can be distributed. Specifically, the higher x is, the less 
desirable the nonprofit status is. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the effect of moving from a zero 
QPQP world (where x=0) to a strictly positive QPQP world (where x>0). The flatter line 
that lies below the 45o line represents the new set of possible equilibria corresponding to 
equation 4.9. The new equilibrium, E2 is represented by a shift along the Rp functions.  
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66 Hospitals that received Hill-Burton funding were required to provide community services and 
uncompensated or charity care annually for twenty years after the date of the expansion. (Wu, 1992) 
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The bigger the QPQP is the larger the number of nonprofit firms that switch their status 
to a for-profit one. Policy makers are said to adopt a don’t throw out the baby with the 
bath water approach, that is, push nonprofits to provide the maximum amount of 
community benefit while maintaining the incentives to preserve their nonprofit status. 
What is the optimal amount of pressure that should be exerted on nonprofit providers? To 
answer this question, we need a measure of welfare. Such a measure would include three 
elements; net community benefits, consumer surplus and producer surplus.  
 
The first element to be maximized is the sum of community benefits produced by all 
nonprofit firms, ( ( )) NFPN n x xπ− , minus forgo tax revenues and government spending on 
subsidies, ( ( )) NFPN n x sub y− ⋅ ⋅ .67 I have labeled this element as, net community benefit 
(NCB):68  
 
(4.10) ( , ( )) ( ( ))( )NFP NFPNCB x n x N n x x sub yπ= − ⋅ − ⋅ . 
The second element is the consumer surplus, ( ( ))CS n x  which is decreasing in the share of 
for-profit firms. For-profit firms are the ‘high cost’ firms and as their share in production 
increases, industry output decreases and price increases, all leading to a loss in consumer 
surplus.69  
(4.11) 
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The third element is the producer surplus, ( , ( ))PS x n x which is the total utility of all 
private firms: NFPFP UnNUnPS ⋅−+⋅= )( . The aggregate utility of for-profit firms 
equals to the number of for-profit firms, )(xn , multiplied by the firm’s profit, ))(( xnFPπ . 
The aggregate utility of nonprofit firms is a product of four components; the number of 
nonprofit firms, ( ( ))N n x− ; the percentage of surplus, which remains in the firm after the 
                                                 
67  The term sub in (4.10) refers to the social cost per unit of production, which includes: subsidies, 
government grants and forgo tax revenue. 
  
68  I assume that those net community benefits are measured correctly. Nevertheless, welfare loss may 
occur from simply basing such pressure on faulty measurements. See David and Helmchen (2003) for a 
discussion of such measurement problems.  
 
69  Note that nonprofit firms are low cost firm due to government subsidies. These subsidies represent a cost 
to society. However, the net community benefits component already includes these welfare costs. 
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QPQP appropriation, (1 )x− ; the surplus generated by each firm, ( ( ))NFP n xπ and the 
average nonprofit δ. In equilibrium, nonprofit hospitals will have a δ between n/N and 1, 
with an average δ of NxnN 2/))(( + . Hence, the producer surplus is given by: 
(4.12)  ))((
2
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Pressure (an increase in x) lowers the nonprofit hospitals’ utility and induces switches 
from nonprofit to for-profit status. In turn, these switches increase the surplus of both 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. The effect of an increase in x on the collective utility of 
firms/owners is ambiguous.70  
A social planner would therefore maximize the sum of (4.10), (4.11) and (4.12): 
 
(4.13) { }( , ( )) ( ( )) ( , ( ))
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Existing welfare analysis is focused on the development of a measurement of community 
benefits. In what follows, I will focus on the consequences of omitting the consumer 
surplus component, which has unambiguous effect on welfare, and leave out the producer 
surplus.   
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x1 is the optimal level of QPQP,  
x0 represents over-pressure. 
x=0 is the optimal level of QPQP,  
x0 represents over-pressure. 
Figure 4.4 
 
                                                 
70  For full discussion on the effects of quid-pro-quo pressure on producer surplus see appendix 4.D. 
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More specifically, I claim that by omitting the potential influence that nonprofit firms 
have on industry output and prices, local authorities focused, for example, primarily on 
charity care, would put too much pressure on nonprofit hospitals (see LHS panel of 
Figure 4.4). When x equals zero and the share of nonprofit firms is non-zero, the net 
community benefits are negative, however, that does not necessarily mean that welfare is 
negative. The consumer surplus is at its peak when x=0, as the mixed-equilibrium share 
of nonprofit firms is in its upper limit. The increase in consumer surplus might offset the 
cost to society of granting subsidies and tax-exemptions. Moreover, under certain 
conditions, x=0 might be the optimal policy (see RHS panel of Figure 4.4).71  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
The object of this section is to test the model presented in the previous section. To 
accomplish this I divide the section in two: In the first part I test the extent to which 
measures of the model’s parameters explain the convergence in capacity. I do this by 
exploiting variation across geographical areas. In the second part I use hospital-level data 
to test the model’s equilibrium prediction by highlighting systematic differences between 
states with high and low shares of for-profit hospitals. 
 
5.1 Analysis of the Convergence Trend  
In this subsection I test to what extent measures of the model’s parameters explain the 
convergence in capacity. I employ both hospital-level and demographic data; hospital-
level data are collected by the American Hospital Association (AHA). For the purpose of 
this analysis, the sample is limited to community hospitals that provide short-term 
general care.72 Community hospitals are facilities whose services are available to the 
general public. Short-term general hospitals are facilities whose primary function is to 
                                                 
71 This is true when 0CS NCB
x x
∂ ∂+ <∂ ∂
, that is, the effect of a decline in consumer surplus is stronger than the 
added value of additional community benefits. 
 
72 Included in this category are all university medical centers, and both teaching and non-teaching hospitals. 
Excluded are all “specialty” hospitals (e.g. psychiatric hospitals, children’s hospitals, respiratory disease 
hospital, long-term facilities etc.) 
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provide patient services for a variety of medical conditions. Hospitals are divided into 
three categories: nonprofit hospitals, for-profit hospitals and government hospitals.73  
 
I consider two geographical partitions: states and metropolitan statistical areas (MSA). 
The Office of Management and Budget defines metropolitan areas for purposes of 
collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal data. The general concept of a metropolitan 
area is that of a large population nucleus, together with adjacent communities having a 
high degree of social and economic integration with that core.74 The concept of 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) has remained essentially the same throughout the 
sample years.75 
 
The panel data sets at the state (including Washington, D.C.) and MSA levels cover the 
years 1970, 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998. The four-year interval data 
rather than year-to-year data are used to allow potential and actual hospitals time to adjust 
their capacity (capital base). Descriptive statistics for the main variables are displayed in 
Appendix 5.B. For the state-level analysis, all 408 state-year pairs include public 
(government) hospitals and private nonprofit hospitals. Private for-profit hospitals appear 
in 82% of state-years (335/408).76 For the remaining (18%) state-years that have no for-
                                                 
73 Hospitals in the nonprofit category are non-governmental entities that are controlled by nonprofit 
organizations. These facilities include mostly hospitals operated by or affiliated with religious 
organizations, community hospitals, cooperative hospitals and hospitals operated by fraternal societies. 
Hospitals in the for-profit category are non-governmental entities that are administered on a for-profit basis, 
most of which are organized legally as corporations. Federal agencies, states, counties, cities and other 
local governments operate hospitals in the government category.  
 
74 Metropolitan areas comprise one or more entire counties, except in New England, where cities and towns 
are the basic geographic units. Each metropolitan area must contain either a place with a minimum 
population of 50,000 or a Census Bureau-defined urbanized area and a total metropolitan area population of 
at least 100,000. A metropolitan area comprises one or more counties. A metropolitan area may also 
include one or more outlying counties that have close economic and social relationships with the central 
county. Metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) are relatively freestanding metropolitan areas and are not 
closely associated with other metropolitan areas.  
 
75 There are two basic comparability issues: first, most metropolitan areas encompassed less territory during 
earlier years than they did in later ones, as the census reconsidered and adjusted the boundaries of each 
metropolitan area to account for growth during each ten-year period. Second, as population grows and 
people migrate to urban areas, new metropolitan areas regularly emerge, so the number of them has steadily 
increased since the concept was first invented. 
 
76 The states Connecticut, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Vermont have no for-profit hospitals throughout the 
sample period. In the states Alaska, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico and Wyoming for-profit hospitals appear in several periods but not in all. In 33 states all three-
ownership types appear in all years.  
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profit hospitals, the ratio of average sizes is not defined. For the MSA-level analysis, I 
examine 2,344 MSA-years, which nest single, double and triple ownership-type markets. 
960 MSA-year pairs (approximately 41%) include both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.  
 
5.1.1 Empirical Framework 
The model developed in the previous section requires the estimation of the following 
vector of structural parameters:  
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The nonprofit-to-for-profit size-ratio is a function of demand shifters, α and β; the 
number of government beds in the market, GyG; the cost advantage of nonprofit firms, 
' '( )FP NFPC C− ; and the share of for-profit firms in the market, n/N. I calculate the size ratio 
as the average number of beds in nonprofit hospitals divided by the average number of 
beds in for-profit hospitals for each geographical area. The for-profit share corresponds to 
the share of for-profit facilities out of all private (for-profit and nonprofit) facilities in a 
given geographical area. I use income per capita and population size as the two demand 
shifters, α and β respectively. Note that an increase in income per capita and population 
size are expected to decrease the size ratio and lead to convergence.77 A decrease in the 
number of government beds, GyG is expected to decrease the size ratio as well. Finally, I 
now turn to the more challenging task of calculating the cost advantage for nonprofit 
hospitals. 
 
A direct test of the theory requires data on the cost advantage for nonprofit hospitals. 
Unfortunately, such data is difficult to obtain. However, by imposing the model’s 
equilibrium condition I have constructed a measure of ' '( )FP NFPC C−  for both state and 
MSA level data (see equation 5.3 below).  
 
The theoretical literature provides several justifications for higher average costs in 
nonprofit hospitals.78 However, empirical cost studies present mixed evidence regarding 
                                                 
77 Note that β equals 1/pop, hence when population increases β  falls and we get convergence. 
 
78  In the quantity-quality model (Newhouse, 1970) average costs will be higher for nonprofits since they 
supply higher quantity and/or quality of care. This argument carries trough for the non-contractible quality 
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cost disparity across hospitals with different ownership types (Malani et. al. 2003). 
Moreover, when properly controlling for scale, input prices, taxes, case-mix severity and 
teaching status, these studies fail to detect systematic difference in efficiency between 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (Sloan, 2000a). Becker and Sloan (1985) found that for-
profit hospitals have higher costs per patient day, but lower costs per adjusted 
admission.79  
QQFP QNFP
P 
B
A
C
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Figure 5.1 
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In the model presented in the previous section, I assume that nonprofit hospitals enjoy 
cost advantages over their for-profit counterparts, such that the average cost of producing 
healthcare in nonprofits is lower. Nevertheless, the observed costs for nonprofit firms 
include both the cost of producing medical services and the cost of producing perks.80 
Analogous to the model presented in the previous section, Figure 5.1 illustrates this 
                                                                                                                                                 
models (e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer, 1998), as nonprofit firms will exert less cost-cutting effort. The 
physician cooperative model (Pauly and Redisch, 1973) yields similar predictions, however in this case, it 
is the choice of input-mix that leads to higher average costs for nonprofit hospitals. 
 
79 One reason for this is the shorter lengths of stay in for-profit hospitals; which raise the cost per day, as 
the intensity of treatment per day is higher. However, since costs spread out over more admissions the cost 
per admission might be lower. 
 
80  Williamson (1964) argues that managers use their authority to divert funds away from profit to serve 
their own self-interests, that is, enhance their own utility. The excess profits are absorbed as discretionary 
expenditure or income. Williamson suggests that managers consciously drive up the cost of production in 
an attempt to further their own self-interests. 
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problem.81 The darker rectangle FPPDCC  represents the profits for the for-profit firm and 
the lighter rectangle NFPPABC  represents the nonprofit firm’s true surplus. However, 
since the nonprofit firm cannot draw cash, the entire surplus rectangle will appear on the 
cost side, much like a fixed cost, where the distance AB measures both the profit margin 
and the average “fixed cost” for the nonprofit firm.  
 
In order to measure the cost advantages for nonprofits, I elicit point B by imposing the 
equilibrium condition in equation (4.7): πFP = δπNFP where δ = n/N (for the uniform 
distribution case), which can be rewritten as:  
(5.2) ' '( ) ( )FP FP FP NFP NFP NFP
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Define, NFPCˆ  as the observed average costs for nonprofit hospitals, FPC  as the average 
costs for for-profit hospitals, and σFP as the for-profit share (n/N). If the production 
function exhibits constant return to scale, the cost advantage for nonprofit hospitals is:82 
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From equation (5.3) we learn that cost advantages for nonprofit hospitals are consistent 
with higher observed average costs. Corresponding to equation (5.1), Equation (5.4) 
specifies the reduced form relationship between the size ratio and its determinants: 
(5.4)  ittit
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The log of the size ratio for state or MSA i in year t is regressed on the vector ln Sit, which 
includes: log income per capita, log population size, log number of beds per capita in 
government hospitals and log cost difference, ' '( )FP NFPC C− . Xt is a set of year dummies, 
and εit is an independently and identically distributed error term. 
 
                                                 
81 The graphical illustration uses U-shaped average cost functions, yet in order to obtain equation (5.3) I 
assume constant return to scale as I did in the model. 
 
82  See appendix 5.A for derivation of equation 5.3. 
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5.1.2 Results 
Table 5.1 presents reduced-form estimates of equation 5.4, which attempts to explain the 
convergence in size between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. In columns 1 and 3, the 
dependent variable is the log size ratio between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals.  In 
columns 2 and 4, the dependant variable is the log share of for-profit hospitals. 
 
Table 5.1 - State and MSA Level Analysis –Reduced-Form Convergence Regressions 
State-Level Analysis MSA-Level Analysis 
Dependent Variable ln Size-Ratio 
 
ln FP Share  ln Size-Ratio ln FP Share 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable     
ln Income per capita 
 
-0.361 
(0.72) 
1.158 
(2.60)*** 
-0.235 
(1.04) 
0.284 
(1.44) 
ln Population 
 
0.365 
(1.54) 
0.161 
(0.77) 
0.266 
(2.42)** 
0.273 
(2.85)*** 
ln Gov. beds per 
capita 
 
0.211 
(2.12)** 
-0.041 
(0.47) 
0.024 
(2.66)** 
-0.002 
(0.16) 
ln Cost dif (+) 
 
0.066 
(3.18)*** 
-0.047 
(2.58)*** 
0.009 
(2.33)** 
-0.005 
(1.28) 
ln Cost dif (-) 
 
-0.017 
(0.89) 
0.014 
(0.78) 
-0.011 
(3.02)*** 
0.014 
(4.39)*** 
Constant 
 
 
-7.248 
(1.27) 
8.876 
(1.76)* 
-0.335 
(0.12) 
-7.512 
(3.08)*** 
R2 
 
0.675 0.899 0.815 0.841 
Obs. 333 333 960 960 
 
The parameter estimates for the state, MSA and time dummies are not reported. Absolute value 
of t-statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
 
All regressions are estimated using ordinary least squares with robust (Huber/White) 
estimates of standard errors; regressions (1) and (2) include state-fixed effects, 
regressions (3) and (4) include MSA-fixed effects, which allow for levels of the key 
variables to systematically differ across states/MSAs.  
 
Note that the cost variable is divided in two; ln Cost Dif (+), the log difference in average 
cost for areas, in which nonprofit hospitals have cost advantages over for-profit hospitals, 
according to equation 5.3, zero otherwise. ln Cost Dif (-) is the log difference in average 
cost for areas, in which for-profit hospitals enjoy cost advantages over nonprofit 
hospitals, zero otherwise.  
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The model predicts that an increase in income per capita, crowding out of government 
hospitals and a decline in the cost advantage of nonprofit hospitals will all have a 
negative effect on the size ratio and a positive effect on the for-profit share. These 
predictions are confirmed by all coefficients in table 5.1. Moreover, half of these 
coefficients are statistically significant. The regressor that yields contradictory coefficient 
estimates is population size, which is expected to have a negative effect on the size 
ratio.83 Nevertheless, the model’s prediction that population size will have a positive 
effect on the for-profit share is confirmed.  
 
In the model, the share of for-profit hospitals and the size ratio are determined 
simultaneously. This simultaneity makes it difficult to isolate the causal effect of changes 
in ownership mix on the size ratio. To deal with this difficulty I rely on the concept that 
areas might differ in their favoritism towards either non-profit or for-profit healthcare 
providers. For example, the share of for-profit institutions in different parts of the US 
may be linked to area specific historical factors. Subsequently, the for-profit market share 
in other healthcare industries may serve as a plausible instrument for the market share of 
for-profit hospitals. (e.g. areas with a higher market share of for-profit hospitals are 
expected to also have a larger for-profit nursing home share). The share of for-profit 
nursing homes in a given area would be correlated with the share of for-profit hospitals in 
that area but presumably uncorrelated with other factors influencing the hospital size-
ratio. If the share of for-profit nursing homes provides an exogenous source of variation 
in the share of for-profit hospitals, changes in the size-ratio of hospitals should not be 
driven by changes in the share of for-profit nursing homes.  
 
Table 5.2 presents estimates of the size ratio (equation 5.3) using the same data sets and 
covariates used in Table 5.1. In columns (1) and (4), OLS coefficients, which do not 
control for the endogeneity of for-profit share, are presented. In the other columns the 
                                                 
83 In the model, population growth leads to convergence only in markets where government providers are 
present. This prediction is confirmed in Appendix 5.D. 
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share of for-profit nursing homes is used as an instrument for the share of for-profit 
hospitals.84 Columns (3) and (6) also include random effects.85  
 
Table 5.2 - State and MSA Level Analysis –Structural-Form Convergence Regressions 
State-Level Analysis MSA-Level Analysis Dependent Variable:  
ln Size-Ratio OLS 
 
(1) 
IV 
 
(2) 
IV 
 
(3) 
OLS 
 
(4) 
IV 
 
(5) 
IV 
 
(6) 
Variable       
ln For-Profit Share  
 
 
-0.206 
(6.67)*** 
-0.254 
(4.03)*** 
-0.253 
(2.99)*** 
-0.257 
(5.10)*** 
-0.521 
(4.29)*** 
-0.581 
(2.08)** 
ln Income per capita 
 
 
-0.835 
(3.98)*** 
-0.936 
(3.90)*** 
-0.698 
(2.27)** 
-0.429 
(1.56) 
-0.155 
(0.50) 
-0.506 
(1.21) 
ln Population 
 
 
0.141 
(4.32)*** 
0.144 
(4.37)*** 
0.135 
(3.11)*** 
0.134 
(2.75)*** 
0.045 
(0.72) 
0.006 
(0.06) 
ln Gov. beds per capita 
 
 
0.059 
(1.28) 
0.083 
(1.54) 
0.113 
(1.77)* 
0.076 
(4.62)*** 
0.071 
(4.05)*** 
0.033 
(1.40) 
ln Cost dif (+) 
 
 
0.092 
(4.38)*** 
0.093 
(4.39)*** 
0.074 
(3.60)*** 
0.028 
(4.03)*** 
0.031 
(4.16)*** 
0.006 
(0.81) 
ln Cost dif (-) 
 
 
-0.025 
(1.24) 
-0.026 
(1.30) 
-0.020 
(0.99) 
-0.011 
(1.84)* 
-0.016 
(2.42)** 
-0.025 
(2.68)*** 
Constant 
 
 
7.159 
(3.52)*** 
7.982 
(3.56)*** 
5.449 
(1.88)* 
3.202 
(1.30) 
1.307 
(0.49) 
5.281 
(1.37) 
Year controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Random Effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Instrument No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
R2 0.4010 0.3962 0.3906 0.3210 0.2626 0.1999 
       
 
   Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  
 
When the share of for-profit hospitals is treated as exogenous in columns (1) and (4), the 
estimated elasticity of the size ratio with respect to the for-profit share is –0.206 for the 
state-level analysis and –0.257 for the MSA-level analysis. In other words, if the share of 
for-profit hospitals in the MSA doubles, the size-ratio declines by 25.7%. 
                                                 
84  The share of for-profit nursing homes is computed using the 2002-03 Nursing Home Compare survey, 
which includes 16,385 nursing homes nationwide. The Center of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
collects and publishes the data. 
 
85  Fixed effects cannot be obtained, as the share of for-profit nursing homes is measured at a point in time 
and therefore does not vary over time. 
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Instrumenting for the for-profit share has a pronounced effect on the estimated elasticity. 
At the MSA level, the estimated elasticity for size ratio is -0.521, which is twice as big as 
the elasticity without instrumenting. At the state level, the estimated elasticity for size 
ratio is -0.254, 23% bigger then the elasticity without instrumenting (-0.206).86  
 
In the theory presented in the previous section I implicitly assume that private hospitals 
are more responsive than government hospitals to market changes and policy 
interventions.87 More specifically, in markets where government hospitals are absent, 
changes in population proportionally affect the capacity choice of nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals, such that the size-ratio is unaffected. On the other hand, in markets where 
government hospitals operate alongside for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, larger 
population is associated with smaller size-ratio. Fortunately, the MSA-level data allows 
for testing this feature; as it nests both MSA-year pairs that include hospitals of all three 
ownership-types and MSA-year pairs that include only for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals.88 To test this effect I add an interaction term between population size and 
government beds to the OLS and IV structural regressions for the MSA-level. The 
coefficient for the resulting interaction term is negative and significant whereas the 
coefficient for population losses its statistical significance.89 
 
All coefficient estimates in table 5.2 have the expected sign accept for population size, 
which has a positive and sometime significant coefficient; however, that might result 
from omitting the interaction between population and the number of government beds. 
The share of for-profit hospitals and the measure of cost advantages for nonprofit 
hospitals are generally significant for both the state and the MSA-level regressions. 
Income per-capita is significant only at the state level, while government beds per-capita 
                                                 
86  When performing a Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogeneity test at the MSA level the critical value of chi-
squared with 1 degree of freedom at the 5 percent level is 3.84. Hence, I reject the null hypothesis and 
conclude that OLS estimators are inconsistent. The reason for these inconsistent estimates is due to the 
endogeneity of the for-profit share. However, when the same test is performed at the state level I cannot 
reject the null hypothesis. 
 
87  Duggan (2000) finds evidence for low responsiveness of government hospitals relative to private ones.  
 
88  Out of the 960 MSA-year pairs that include both for-profit and nonprofit hospitals, 816 (85%) also 
include government providers, whereas 144 (15%) include only for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. 
 
89  See Appendix 5.D for the explicit test and results. 
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is significant only at the MSA-level. These results highlight the importance of industry 
wide effects in explaining the convergence trend. 
 
5.2. Analysis of the Equilibrium Properties 
In this subsection I test the model’s equilibrium prediction by highlighting systematic 
differences across states with high vs. low share of for-profit hospitals. More precisely, 
the model asserts that an increase in the share of for-profit hospitals, holding output and 
the number of competitors constant, would increase the nonprofit hospital’s surplus. 
Moreover, when holding the distribution of δ across locations constant, high for-profit 
share corresponds to higher average δ for those hospitals that choose to maintain their 
nonprofit status. In other words, the higher the for-profit market share, the higher the 
utility of nonprofit hospitals in equilibrium.90 That is, nonprofit hospitals are better off, 
ceteris paribus, when competing against for-profit hospitals rather then other nonprofit 
hospitals.   
 
But, how can we measure if a hospital is better off? One approach is to look at their 
reported surplus. However, the effect of an increase in the market share of for-profit 
competitors has an ambiguous effect on reported surplus. On the one hand, reported 
surplus increase with surplus, yet on the other hand hospitals that remain nonprofit are 
better on average in turning cash into perks and hence smaller fractions of the true 
surplus are reported. Therefore, looking at reported surplus would not serve as a good 
candidate for testing the theory.91 Another way would be to directly identify perks, 
however this is no doubt a challenging task, as perks may take many shapes and forms. 
For example, one can detect potential perks-related expenditure items, such as, extensive 
managerial compensation or large travel or meetings expenditures.92 In what follows I 
propose a third approach. 
 
                                                 
90 The utility of the nonprofit hospital is U = δπ, since both δ and π increase with the share of for-profit 
hospitals so is the nonprofit hospital’s utility. 
 
91 I find it important to control for reported surplus since there is a trade off between the amount of reports 
surplus and expenditure such as travel or meetings. 
 
92 Similar to Frumkin and Keating (2001), Ballou and Weisbrid (2003), Erus and Weisbrod (2003) and 
Brickley and Van Horn (2003) I study nonprofits’ CEO compensations. 
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As discussed in the previous subsection, observed expenditures can be thought of as a 
combination of two types of expenditure: those relating directly to the provision of 
medical services and expenditures, which correspond to the production of perks. Holding 
output constant (e.g. the size of the hospital) the larger the perks-related activity, the 
smaller is the share of expenditure devoted to the provision of medical services. For 
simplicity, I assume that the labor and capital shares are fixed.93 Controlling for the 
number of hospitals in the market, the number of beds and reported surplus, the labor 
share is expected to be negatively correlated with the size of perks’ production. A testable 
hypothesis can be formulated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis: states with relatively high market share of for-profit hospitals would have 
relatively low labor-shares (out of total expenditure), due to strong perks-related activity. 
 
To test this hypothesis I use information on exempt organizations from the Internal 
Revenue Service's Business Master File (BMF) collected from hospitals’ Form 990.94 
And matching the IRS file with data from the American Hospital Association (AHA) 
Guide for 2002-2003. This data set includes hospital-level cross-section from seven 
states. Three states have high share of for-profit hospitals: Florida (52%), Louisiana 
(58%) and Nevada (56%) whereas the remaining four states have low shares of for-profit 
hospitals: Connecticut (0%), Illinois (9%), Massachusetts (7%) and Michigan (1%). This 
data has an advantage over the one used in the previous subsection as it includes detailed 
expenditure data, which contains managers’ compensation.95  
 
Figure 5.2 presents a scatter plot of the labor share and the ruling year (The year that the 
IRS granted an organization 501(c)(3) status) for 325 nonprofit hospitals. In both these 
dimensions I find systematic differences across states with high vs. low for-profit market 
                                                 
93 There may be reasons to suspect that nonprofit hospitals, which operate in areas with high share of for-
profit hospitals, would have different capital intensity relative to nonprofit hospitals, which operate in areas 
with low share of for-profit hospitals. 
 
94 Form 990, entitled “Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax,” is a report that must be filed each 
year with the IRS by organizations exempt from Federal income taxes under section 501 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and whose annual receipts are normally more than $25,000 a year. 
 
95 In some cases there is a discrepancy between the reporting unit in Form 990 and the one in the AHA 
survey, I use only those units that appear in both data sources. For Summary statistics see Appendix 5.B. 
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share. The dark circles represent 260 hospitals in states with high for-profit market share 
while the light circles represent 65 hospitals in states with low for-profit market share. 
Note that 15% of all hospitals entered or converted to nonprofit status in 1946, the year in 
which the Hill Burton Act was introduced.96  Finally, the overall labor share levels are 
lower in states with high for-profit shares. The mean labor share in states with high for-
profit share is 0.403 while the mean labor share in states with low for-profit share is 
0.46.97  
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To test the hypothesis I run the following regression: 
 
(5.5) iiii XDY εγβα +++= lnln  
 
                                                 
96 In states with low for-profit share 28.8% of hospitals existed before 1946, while only 7.7% of hospitals 
existed before 1946 in states with high market share of for-profit hospitals. However, since this is a 2001-
2002 data, these numbers might reflect different history or different duration (e.g. different exit or 
switching rates). 
 
97 The null hypothesis that the difference between the two means is zero is rejected at the 1% confidence 
level. 
 
Figure 5.2: Scatter plot of labor-share and ruling-year for states with high and low for-
profit hospitals’ market share. 
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Where, ln Yi is either log labor-share, log CEO’s compensation, log travel expenditure or 
log meeting expenditure in hospital i. Di is a dummy variable (0 if hospital i operates in a 
state with low for-profit market share and 1 if hospital i operates in a state with high for-
profit market share), ln Xi is a vector of hospital-level characteristics which include: 
ruling year, log number of beds, Herfindahl-Hirschman index, log Medicare case mix 
index, teaching hospital dummies (major, minor and non-teaching), religious affiliation 
dummy, log average length of stay and log reported surplus.98 εi is an independently and 
identically distributed error term.  
 
Table 5.3 – The impact of for-profit share on hospitals’ labor share, travel expenditures, 
meeting expenditures and CEO compensation. 
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
ln Labor Share 
 
ln CEO compensation 
 
 
OLS  
(1) 
 
WLS  
(2) 
OLS  
(3) 
 
WLS  
(4) 
High vs. Low For-Profit Share 
State Dummy 
 
-0.125 
(5.04)*** 
-0.128 
(5.70)*** 
-0.316 
(1.26) 
-0.135 
(0.92) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.185 
 
0.204 
 
0.258 
 
0.324 
Obs. 
 
325 325 236 236 
     
Dependent Variable: 
 
ln Travel Expenditure 
 
ln Meeting Expenditure 
 
OLS  
(5) 
 
WLS  
(6) 
OLS  
(7) 
 
WLS  
(8) 
High vs. Low For-Profit Share 
State Dummy 
 
-0.250 
(0.18) 
-0.423 
(0.34) 
-1.169 
(0.74) 
-1.116 
(0.72) 
 
R2 
 
 
0.091 
 
0.116 
 
0.145 
 
0.155 
Obs. 
 
325 325 325 325 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
Explanatory variables include: 501(c)(3) ruling year, log number of beds, log surplus, Herfindahl index, log 
Medicare case mix, teaching hospital dummies (major, minor and non-teaching), religious affiliation 
dummy, log average length of stay. 
 
Table 5.3 presents the results from the estimation of equation (5.5). In the first two 
columns the dependent variable is log labor share, in columns (3) and (4) the dependent 
variable is log CEO’s compensation, in columns (5) and (6) the dependent variable is log 
                                                 
98 Since surplus also represent deficit this variable is divided into: ln Surplus (+), the log surplus when the 
hospital indeed runs a surplus, zero otherwise and ln Surplus (-), the log surplus when the hospital has a 
deficit, zero otherwise. 
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travel expenditures and in columns (7) and (8) the dependent variable is log meeting 
expenditures. Using a Cook-Weisberg (1983) test, I find heteroskedasticity in all OLS 
regressions. Even-numbered columns represent an attempt to correct for this 
heteroskedasticity using weighted least squares approach, in which the weights are 
obtained from a Breusch-Pagan (1979) regression.99 
 
As predicted from the theory, the coefficient of the share of for-profit hospitals’ dummy 
is negative and highly significant in the log labor share regression. However, the share of 
for-profit hospitals dummy does not seem to explain hospital CEO’s compensation, travel 
expenditures or meeting expenditures.100 
 
6. Discussion  
While private hospitals in the US can organize as either nonprofit or for-profit 
institutions, nonprofit hospitals dominate the hospital industry with a persistently large 
share of beds (about 70%) over the period from 1960 to 2000. Moreover, nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals are subject to different regulatory rules, in particular the tax code. 
More specifically, nonprofit hospitals are eligible for exemptions from property, sales, 
and income taxes, while for-profit hospitals are required to pay these taxes. Despite these 
legal and regulatory distinctions, there has been growing similarity in capacity between 
nonprofit and for-profit hospitals during these four decades.101 One of the driving forces 
behind this growing similarity (i.e. convergence) is the noteworthy number of ownership 
switches from nonprofit to for-profit status and vice-versa.  
 
Interestingly, failing to appreciate the dynamics of this convergence contributes to the 
perception that the hospital industry is somewhat stagnant with respect to ownership 
composition. Due to this perception, scholars often fuse hospitals’ ownership status and 
                                                 
99 From the OLS regressions (column 1, 3, 5 and 7) I obtain the studentized-residuals. I run a second 
regression, in which the estimated residuals squared is regressed on the same right-hand side variables as in 
the OLS regression. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 represent weighted least squares regressions in which the 
inverse predicted values from the second regression are used as analytical weights in the first one. 
  
100  The hospital CEO’s compensation seems to be explained primarily by the size of the organization and 
by the size of the hospital’s surplus. 
 
101 This trend of growing similarity, which I refer to also as convergence in size, is documented and 
described in section 2 of this paper. 
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hospitals’ objectives. Therefore, it is not surprising that for some, for-profit hospitals 
symbolize profit seeking, compassionless, and opportunistic motives, whereas, nonprofit 
hospitals are often viewed as community oriented charitable institutions. Moreover, this 
belief is often used to justify preferential treatment for nonprofit hospitals. However, such 
belief fails to account for the convergence in capacity and is based on a faulty rationale. 
More specifically, when firms essentially choose between two distinct regulatory 
systems, observed discrepancy in behavior does not necessarily correspond to variation in 
objectives. In that sense a simple revealed-preferences argument need not work in the 
case of nonprofit organizations. Clearly, the quest for identifying the objectives of 
nonprofit hospitals is important for shaping courts’ decisions, government policies, and 
antitrust interventions. Yet, if policymakers and legislators rely on nonfactual arguments 
they might be led to promote dangerous and irresponsible policy interventions. In my 
view, to the extent that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals exhibit systematic differences in 
behavior, the nonprofit hospital’s behavior might be a consequence of the hospital’s 
regulatory environment and not the product of unusual objectives.102  
 
There is evidence to support the notion that the regulatory environment enables and 
induces community-oriented behavior on the part of nonprofit hospitals. For-example, 
Wu (1992) points out that nonprofit hospitals that received Hill-Burton funding were 
required to provide community services and uncompensated or charity care annually for 
twenty years after the date of the hospital’s expansion. Likewise, in several legal cases 
courts required nonprofit hospitals to provide uncompensated care and threatened to 
revoke their tax-exempt status if they failed to do so. Finally, Fournier and Campbell 
(1997) find that nonprofit hospitals are indirectly compensated for the provision of 
indigent care with legal protections against competition under certificate-of-need 
regulation. What is clear from these examples is that nonprofits’ finer community 
oriented behavior, to the extent that it exists, need not be altruistic or unselfish. The 
regulatory environment provides enough sticks and carrots to produce variation in 
behavior between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.  
                                                 
102 Note that it is not evident that there are systematic differences between nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals. For example, Sloan and Vraciu (1983) found that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals in Florida 
were virtually identical in terms of profit margins, dollar value of charity care, percentage of Medicare and 
Medicaid patient days, and net operating funds per admission and patient days.  
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Moreover, if nonprofit hospitals indeed shared strong intrinsic attributes, which separate 
them from for-profit hospitals, then evidence for that is more likely to originate at the 
organization level rather than at the industry level. For example, if nonprofit hospitals 
selflessly seek to provide benefits to the communities in which they operate one would 
find evidence for hospital-level mechanisms that encourages and enforces such altruistic 
behavior. Still, Milstead (1999) finds that despite the growing focus on community 
benefits, most compensation plans for executives of nonprofit health care organizations 
do not include goals or provisions for providing such benefits.  Likewise, Brickley and 
Van Horn (2003) find no evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide explicit incentives for 
their CEOs to focus on altruistic activities. Both articles essentially claim that the 
behavior of nonprofit hospitals does not seem to be induced by hospital-level built-in 
incentive mechanisms.  
 
The same can be said of for-profit hospitals.  They do not have organizationally defined 
incentives to avoid providing benefits to the community, and yet, they pick a regulatory 
environment that compels them to provide a community benefit by paying taxes.  Thus, 
both types of hospitals are forced to pay a tax of some sort for the benefit of the 
community. Clearly, hospitals that choose the for-profit form do so despite the fact that 
they will have to pay out taxes. Surely no one believes that such behavior can be traced 
back to their objectives in the sense that these hospitals take pleasure in paying out taxes. 
Tax liability is no doubt a feature of the for-profit hospitals’ regulatory environment.  
Applying this logic to the nonprofit sector, I argue that those hospitals that organize as 
nonprofit entities might do so despite the fact that they will be more likely to face outside 
pressure to provide free or unprofitable services. The cost of free care is simply a “tax” 
paid out by nonprofit hospitals to the communities in which they operate. CEOs of 
nonprofit hospitals are not induced to focus on altruistic activities in the very same way 
that CEOs of for-profit hospitals do not receive a fat bonus for paying out corporate 
taxes.  
 
Hospitals’ behavior not only reflects their objectives but also corresponds to their 
economic, legal and political environment. The evidence shown above highlights the role 
of the different hospitals’ environments in explaining variation in behavior between 
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nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, whereas differences in objectives across ownership 
forms seem to play a minor role. Yet, there are scholars who subscribe to the supposition 
that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals have different a-priori objectives and that these 
objectives justify preferential treatment for the latter.  They dismiss as skeptics those 
scholars who suggest that it is the preferential treatment that induces such variation in 
behavior, as if those scholars possess a general incredulity towards the idea that some 
people are kindhearted while others are not. Nevertheless, the notion of skepticism would 
have been in place if it meant that one views the knowledge in this particular area as 
incomplete, and have doubt about theories that ignore equally feasible eventualities.  
 
One of these eventualities is the growing similarity in capacity between nonprofit and 
for-profit hospitals, which is the main focus of this paper. This growing similarity raises a 
conceptual obstacle for the assertion that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals have 
intrinsically different objectives. This is especially true when, currently, for-profit and 
nonprofit hospitals treat a rather similar mix of patients in addition to offering and 
delivering comparable services. I claim that the growing similarity between for-profits 
and nonprofit hospitals is the result of changing market conditions. For instance, these 
changes include: crowding out of government owned hospitals, growing population size 
and changes in policy dynamics (e.g. tax code, antitrust involvement, federal and state 
programs).103 If different behavior is merely the product of different objectives, then 
growing similarity in behavior must correspond to growing similarity in objectives. Some 
scholars subscribe to such a statement and claim that nonprofit hospitals simply “lost 
their way”.104 However, according to Stigler and Becker (1977) the treatment of 
individual preferences as constant is more valuable and credible for finding an economic 
reason for observed market changes.105   
                                                 
103  The effects of such market changes on the convergence in capacity are discussed in length in section 4. 
 
104  “If voluntary [nonprofit] hospital trustees and managers are indeed at risk of loosing sight of the 
historical mission and social raison d'être of their institutions, it is incumbent upon them to stop and take 
stock of what it means to be a voluntary institution,….” (Seay and Vladeck, 1988) or “...in pursuing the 
business mission, they [nonprofit hospitals] will lose their identity, their soul, and perhaps their tax-exempt 
status.” (Jones and Du Val, 1988) 
 
105 “...we are proposing the hypothesis that widespread and/or persistent human behavior can be explained 
by a generalized calculus of utility-maximizing behavior, without introducing the qualification “tastes 
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In this growing similarity between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, a significant role is 
attributed to ownership-type switches. This is especially true for the period after the 
introduction of the prospective payment system, when relatively large nonprofit hospitals 
converted into for-profit status and hence made the typical for-profit and nonprofit 
hospital more comparable106. But why switch? Did the entrepreneur become benevolent 
or did the altruist become self-centered? Or maybe, those that switched to nonprofit were 
simply “for-profits in disguise”, finally revealing their true face107. It is particularly tough 
to explain switching behavior when relying on the assertion that nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals exhibit strong systematic differences in objectives. I claim that a set of initial 
market conditions dictates the initial mix of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. A change 
in those conditions can, subsequently, alter the initial mix through switching.  
 
When one syntactically splits the objectives of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals into 
altruistic and opportunistic ones respectively, the notion of mix equilibrium becomes 
rather trivial. Under this view of the world, the demand for nonprofit hospitals’ services 
would be fairly detached from the demand for for-profit hospitals’ services, as these 
services are differentiated. This notion of mix equilibrium is flawless in a stagnant world; 
however, the dynamics of convergence and conversions raise serious doubts regarding 
the validity such arguments. To avoid such limitation, the model presented in section 4 
considers the uniform goal of surplus maximization for both for-profit and nonprofit 
hospitals. The healthcare industry is viewed as offering private firms a choice between 
two alternative ownership statuses; a firm’s selection of ownership type is viewed as a 
vehicle to reach its objectives rather than a reflection of those objectives.  
 
As an illustration, instead of a firm that chooses between nonprofit and for-profit status, 
consider a driver who chooses between two alternative routes, both leading to the same 
destination. The driver’s choice might depend on various factors, such as road condition, 
                                                                                                                                                 
remaining the same.” It is a thesis that does not permit of direct proof because it is an assertion about the 
world, not a proposition in logic.“ (Stigler and Becker, 1977) 
 
106  See the discussion in section 2: The Dynamics of the US Hospital Market. 
 
107  See the discussion in section 3: The Taxonomy of Economic Models of Nonprofit Firms. 
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distance, speed limit, tolls, number of stoplights, as well as the choice of other 
commuters.  A representative driver, who wishes to minimize traveling time, is 
indifferent between the two alternative routes whenever traveling time is equal across the 
two alternatives. I claim that hospitals’ choice of ownership status is, to some extent, 
analogous to the commuter’s choice between alternative roads, as it reflects a means and 
not an end. Moreover, by weighing up the costs and benefits of operating each road, city 
officials might advocate closing one road on efficiency grounds. That is, when the costs 
of operating the road exceed the benefits. Similarly, mixed-ownership equilibrium is not 
necessarily optimal. Under certain conditions, actions such as revoking the nonprofit 
status or prohibiting the operation of for-profit hospitals might represent a more desirable 
market setting.  
 
The analogy between the commuter’s problem and the hospital’s problem emphasizes the 
distinction between means and ends; however, in other aspects these problems are not 
analogous. For example, these models result in opposite feedback effects, as switching 
from one road to the other makes the former more desirable. In the hospitals’ case 
switching from nonprofit to for-profit status makes the nonprofit status less attractive, 
therefore, a stable equilibrium notion hinges on some built-in heterogeneity among 
hospitals or among consumers. Such heterogeneity is not necessary to sustain a stable 
equilibrium in the commuter’s problem. In my formulation, this heterogeneity is 
represented by variation in the ability to benefit from a given ownership type rather than 
a variation in the propensity to trade off hospital-level profits for the promotion of 
community interests. 
 
Guarding such community interests, policymakers and legislators need a clear view of 
what for-profit and nonprofit hospitals represent in order to effectively promote goals 
such as: access to care, quality of services and fair competition. In my view, relying on 
the idea that nonprofit and for-profit hospitals differ in their objectives produces a rather 
weak justification for favoring nonprofit providers, by granting them special tax 
treatment. Oddly enough, preferential treatment favoring nonprofit hospitals would be 
more valuable for society if nonprofit hospitals’ community-oriented behavior was 
induced by their unique regulatory status rather than by their unique objectives. For 
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example, if different tax treatment induces different behavior and such taxation 
dissimilarities were eliminated one would expect to see a dramatic change in the behavior 
of nonprofit hospitals. On the other hand, one would expect a relatively mild change in 
behavior if originally; this behavior was induced by nonprofit hospitals’ mission to 
benefit society.  
 
Policymakers and legislators should also realize that hospitals do not operate in a 
vacuum. Rather, the growing number of conversions, consolidations and alliances should 
highlight the importance of strategic behavior among hospitals.108 By affiliating with 
neighboring hospitals or systems the hospital enjoys both greater bargaining power with 
payers and scale economies (Hollis, 1997). The lack of stabilizing feedback effects in my 
model provides yet another rationale for consolidations among nonprofit providers. 
Affiliations and alliances between nonprofit hospitals serve as a commitment device and 
stabilize the market’s ownership mix. Binding contracts that unify the control over two or 
more nonprofit hospitals, removes the potential externality imposed by an individual 
switcher on other nonprofit hospitals.  Similar to the prisoner’s dilemma, a local hospital 
market can collapse into for-profit ownership, as switching from nonprofit to for-profit 
might be the dominant strategy facing each individual hospital in a non-cooperative 
equilibrium. Hospitals would be trapped in an inefficient solution, which can be 
improved upon by consolidation.   
 
In conclusion, the regulatory environment appears to play a key role in explaining 
differences in behavior between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. The fact that nonprofit 
and for-profit providers compete in the same markets yet are subject to different 
regulatory rules cast serious doubt on the idea that observed differences in behavior 
between the two hospitals could be used to elicit their objectives.109 
                                                 
108 See David and Helmchen (2003) 
 
109  For example, Jones and Du Val (1988) pose the question “What would be lost to our society if 
voluntary [nonprofit] hospitals were to de-emphasize or abandon their community services missions and 
pursue primarily or solely their business mission?” this faulty assertion views the organization’s ownership 
status and objectives as one. Another example is found in Schramm (1988) who posses the following 
questions with respect to nonprofit and for-profit hospitals “Are we dominated by the profit motive? Is 
there no place in our society for pure altruism? Will economics prevail over compassion? Is nothing 
sacred?”. 
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There is little doubt that hospitals, whether for-profit or nonprofit, possess unique 
features that require them to balance economic, ethical, professional and social 
considerations. However, whether or not nonprofit and for-profit hospitals have 
intrinsically different objectives is not merely a matter of competing viewpoints. 
Uniformity in objectives across ownership-types is not a belief but rather a working 
assumption. This assumption encourages one to seek explanations for phenomena such as 
the growing similarity in capacity, mixed ownership equilibrium or switching of 
ownership form by applying standard economic logic.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I provide evidence of the growing similarity in capacity between for-profit 
and nonprofit hospitals. Convergence in both the average size and the size distribution 
persists over time. As discussed in section 2, the convergence trend is driven by both 
convergence in the number of patients treated and convergence in length of stay. 
Moreover, the convergence in capacity was driven primarily by industry-wide effects 
such as entry, exit and ownership switches, rather than expansions or downsizing of 
existing hospitals. The convergence trend persisted over the period of 1960 to 2000 and 
survived certificate-of-need regulation, the prospective payment reimbursement system 
and the expansion of managed care. Pressure exerted by courts and local governments 
also contributed to the convergence, especially when standard welfare maximization is 
overlooked and instead focus is drawn to the individual hospital.  
 
In view of these findings, I introduce a taxonomy of economic models of nonprofit firms 
that integrates existing models and identifies a potentially missing conceptualization, in 
which firms have identical objectives yet differ in their ability to benefit from a given 
ownership status. The model highlights the role of localized competition, demographic 
changes, crowding out of government hospitals, the cost advantage of nonprofit hospitals 
and the share of for-profit hospitals in explaining the growing similarity among private 
hospitals. In addition, I introduce a simple welfare analysis that illustrates how pressuring 
nonprofit hospitals to appropriate a fraction of their surplus towards community benefits 
may actually decrease economic welfare.  
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The empirical analysis in section 5 examines the growing similarity in size over the 1970 
– 1998 period. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 report results from estimating the theoretical model at 
the state and metropolitan statistical area levels. Results in this section indicate that 
variations in demand, government provision of hospital services, share of for-profit 
hospitals and cost advantages for nonprofit hospitals explain much of the convergence in 
size between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. For the most part, the directions of these 
effects are consistent with the theory I lay out in section 4. In order to further substantiate 
some of the more fundamental equilibrium predictions, I test the effect of the market 
share of for-profit hospitals on both the nonprofit hospital’s labor share and its CEO’s 
compensation. For the case of labor shares, I find a strong negative correlation, 
suggesting that a nonprofit hospital is more likely to exhibit strong perk related behavior 
when it operates in a high for-profit share state. However, this is not the case for CEOs 
compensation, which are similar across states with high and low shares of for-profit 
hospitals. Overall, the evidence presented in both subsections 5.1 and 5.2 is more 
suggestive than definitive. More specifically, the empirical analysis does not refute 
alternative conceptualizations, such as the altruism model. Nevertheless, it generally does 
supports the implications of the model, presented in section 4.  
 
There is little doubt that hospitals, whether for-profit or nonprofit, possess unique 
features that require them to balance economic, ethical, professional and public 
considerations. Yet, whether or not nonprofit and for-profit hospitals have intrinsically 
different objectives remains an open question. In fact, there is no conceptual need to rely 
on differences in objectives in order to explain the growing similarity in capacity, which I 
have documented in this paper, or the coexistence of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. In 
particular, this paper produces similar predictions using standard economic logic by 
relying on uniformity in objectives across ownership type. 
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Appendix 2.A 
The change in this ratio as we move from year j to year i, is given by: 
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By adding and subtracting common term we get: 
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By rearranging the expression above we get: 
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Appendix 2.B 
Graphical Decomposition of Ratios: 
In this case all three groups positively contribute to 
the convergence process. The 70-74, 74-78, 86-90, 
90-94 and 94-98 periods have this feature. 
In this case the entrants negatively contribute to the 
convergence process (offset the effect of stayers and 
exitors). The 78-82 and 82-86 periods are an example 
for this case. 
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Appendix 4.A 
 
When we don’t have constant marginal costs, output will appear on both sides of (2) - (4). 
The first order conditions for nonprofit and for-profit firms can be represented by the 
following two implicit functions: 
 'FPFPFP CyY −−−= ββαψ  and, 'NFPNFPNFP CyY −−−= ββαψ .  
For a given parameter or variable s, we can use the implicit function theorem to sign both 
FPFP
FPFP
y
s
ds
dy
∂∂
∂∂−= ψ
ψ and 
NFPNFP
NFPNFP
y
s
ds
dy
∂∂
∂∂−= ψ
ψ
 
The effect of a change in s on the size ratio is given by: 


 −=

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
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y
yd
FP
FP
NFPNFP
FP
FP
NFP
1  
Define '2
2
k
k
k
k C
y
y
c
∂
∂≡ε as the elasticity of supply for firm with ownership type k. 
The sign of this derivative depends on the sign of the expression in the square brackets.   
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For a sufficiently high share of for-profit firms, a sufficient condition for the model’s 
predictions to hold when firms have increasing marginal costs is an equally or more 
elastic supply function for nonprofit firms. Nevertheless, the model’s prediction could be 
preserved even if supply is more elastic for the for-profit firm, as long as, it is sufficiently 
close to the nonprofit firm’s supply elasticity.  
 
Appendix 4.B 
 
Assuming nonprofits have cost advantage over for-profit firms, 
0'' >− NFPFP CC   
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Using (4.3) and (4.4) we get, 
FPNFP yy >   
Appendix 4.C 
 
Here we are interested in the partial derivative of the nonprofit-to-for-profit size ratio 
with respect to the number of for-profit firms in the industry. 
0
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It is fairly easy to show that the second derivative is positive; hence the convergence 
process has a concave shape, which corresponds to the observed trends, Figure 2.1 and 
Figure 2.2. 
 
Appendix 4.D 
 
Why is the effect of quid-pro-quo pressure on nonprofit hospitals on overall producer 
surplus ambiguous?  According to the figure below, in state 0, equilibrium is reached at 
n0/N. the blue segment represent the level of utility for each level of δ. To the left of n0/N 
all hospitals organize as for-profits while to the left of n0/N all hospitals organize as 
nonprofits.  The red segment represent the effect of pressure, in the form of x>0. 
Equilibrium is reached at n1/N. pressure rotates the increasing segment downwards, while 
subsequent switching from nonprofit to for-profit status shifts the horizontal line up.  
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Pressure has a negative effect on total producer surplus, however it induces switching. 
In turn, switching has a positive effect on total producer surplus. Hence, the direction 
of change in overall producer surplus is ambiguous. It depends on the relative size of 
the areas to the right and to the left of n*/N. When such pressure is introduced, firms 
choosing to maintain their nonprofit status have lower utility. Conversely, firms that 
were for-profit originally gain from the pressure on nonprofits. This result is 
ambiguous for switchers (nonprofit to for-profit), as it depends on their initial value 
of δ. Switchers with relatively low δ will gain while switchers with relatively high δ 
will lose. 
 
Appendix 5.A 
 
Starting with equation (5.2):  
 
(5.2) ' '( ) ( )FP FP FP NFP NFP NFP
n np C y p C y
N N
π π= − = − =  
 
Using (4.5) and (4.6) the marginal cost of the nonprofit firm can be expressed as a 
function of the demand parameters, the marginal cost of the for-profit firm and the 
number of nonprofit and for-profit firms.  
 
(5.2’)  
' '
' ( )( 1) ( 1)
( ( 1))
FP G FP FP
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C
N n n
α β σ
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n
N
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The true difference in average costs between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals is: 
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Under the assumption of constant return to scale, average and marginal cost are equal, 
FPFP CC =' . Hence, we can replace our notation, such that FPFP CC =' . Using area-level 
data on expenditures-per-bed we can obtain points A and C (in Figure 5.1) for each pair 
of geographical area and year. The method employed here takes the ratio of average daily 
expenditure to average hospitals’ size for each geographical area (i.e. obtain a weighted 
average were high cost hospitals receive larger weights). An alternative approach would 
be to compute the average daily expenditure-per-bed of hospitals within a geographical 
area, giving equal weights to each hospital.  
 
Furthermore, since nonprofit firms set cash profits equal to zero the price in equilibrium 
will equal that observed average costs for nonprofits (point A). We can, therefore, replace 
price by the observed average costs for nonprofits, NFPCp ˆ= . Equation 5.2 becomes an 
equation with a single unknown, 'NFPC , the true average cost of producing healthcare 
services in nonprofit hospitals. Incorporating FPC  and NFPC  into 5.2’’, we get: 
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Appendix 5.B 
 
List of Model Variables, Means, Standard Deviations and Sources 
 
 
State MSA Variable 
Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Description of Variable and Source 
Ratio 2.14    1.62 2.63    2.23 The state-level ratio of the average number of beds in 
nonprofit hospitals divided by the average number of beds 
in for-profit hospitals.a 
 
Income per capita 13,965 7,721 14,317 7,740 State/MSA personal income per capita divided by CPI. b,c 
 
Population 5,304 5,289 941 1,381 Total population (in thousands). b  
 
Cost differences 121.8 235 90.4 144 The difference in hospital costs per adjusted patient day in 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (using equation 5.2). a, b 
 
Cost per day 649 564 612 483 Hospital costs per adjusted patient day, for all hospitals, 
divided by CPI (1982=100.)  a, b 
 
Government beds 6,344 5,877 1,008 1,552 The total number of public owned hospital beds in the state 
or MSA. a 
 
For-profit hospitals 
share 
0.156 0.176 0.348 0.188 The share of for-profit hospitals out of all private hospitals 
(for-profit and nonprofit) in a state/MSA. a  
 
For-profit nursing 
homes share 
0.672 0.161 0.605 0.163 The share of for-profit nursing homes out of all private 
nursing homes (for-profit and nonprofit) in a state/MSA. d  
      
a American Hospital Association, Hospital Statistics, Various issues.  
b U.S Statistical Abstract, Various Issues. 
c Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce (at www.bea.gov) 
d Nursing Home Compare, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) (at www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/home.asp) 
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Appendix 5.C  
 
List of Model Variables, Means, Standard Deviations and Sources 
 
 
High FP Share States Low FP Share States Variable 
Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Description of Variable and Source 
      
Labor Share 0.403    0.078 0.46    0.068 The share of payroll expenses (all salaries, wages and 
benefits) out of total expenditure. a 
 
CEO compensation 295,072 231,159 284,771 223,411 Total compensation for the highest paid officer. a 
 
     Base salary 256,798 194,804 253,237 201,222 Base salary of highest paid officer. a  
     Benefits 38,274 58,933 31,534 53,123 Benefits, bonuses and allowances of highest paid officer. a 
 
Travel Expenses 216,146 297,504 194,968 268,062 Total expenses on travel. a  
 
Meeting Expenses 74,878 183,739 79,778 155,840 Total expenses on hospital’s meetings and conferences. a  
 
      
Ruling year 1968.3 17.7 1957.8 19.5 The year that the IRS granted the hospital 501 status. a 
 
Medicare Case Mix 
  
1.471 0.246 1.317 0.223 Index for the complexity of Medicare cases treated by a 
hospital relative to all hospital cases (using DRGs). c 
 
ALOS 
 
5.002 0.897 4.627 1.095 Average Length of Stay in the hospital. c 
Number of Beds 215.0 55.2 239.55 36.3 Number of beds, regularly maintained (set up and staffed 
for use) for inpatients. b 
 
Competition 0.594 0.433 0.673 0.361 Herfindahl index based on the share of hospitals’ beds in 
city/town (AHA terminology). b  
 
Religious  
 
0.261 0.443 0.196 0.398 Religious Nonprofits = 1, Secular Nonprofits = 0. c 
Teaching Hospital 
 
0.246 0.434 0.315 0.491 Non-Teaching Hospital = 0, All other = 1. c 
Major Teaching  
 
0.123 0.331 0.127 0.334 Major Teaching Hospital = 1 (A member of the Council of 
Teaching hospitals), All other = 1. c 
Surplus 2,482 12,600 2,662 9,710 Excess or deficit for the year  (in thousands). a  
      
 
a Internal Revenue Service – Business Master File . 
b American Hospital Association, 2002 Guide. 
c Profile of U.S Hospitals, HCIA 1997. 
 
Appendix 5.D 
 
Consider the following variant of the specification in equation (5.4): 
 
ittititititit
itFP
NFP XSPopGovPopRy
y
y εδγββµ +++⋅++==



lnlnlnlnlnln 21  
 
I took the log population in the MSA, itPopln  out of the vector ln Sit and added the 
interaction term )ln(ln itit PopGov × between the log number of public owned beds in the 
MSA and the log population in the MSA. ln Sit, Xt and εit are defined in equation (5.4). 
Columns (1) and (2) treat the share of for-profit hospitals as exogenous, whereas, column 
(3) treats it as endogenous.  
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In markets where government hospitals are absent, changes in population affect nonprofit 
and for-profit hospitals proportionately, whereas, in market where government hospitals 
operate along side nonprofit and for-profit hospitals, larger population is associated with 
smaller size ratio. 
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The null hypothesis is therefore:110  
H0: β1=0 and β2<0 
H1: other 
 
Table App.5.D 
 
Dependent variable:  
ln Size-Ratio 
 
OLS 
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
IV 
(3) 
Coefficient    
ln Population (β1) 0.065 
(1.51) 
0.198 
(0.94) 
0.112  
(1.55) 
ln Government beds  
x ln Population (β2) 
-0.561  
(4.86)*** 
 
-0.691 
(3.40)*** 
-0.498 
(2.58)** 
Year controls Yes Yes Yes 
MSA controls No Yes No 
Instrument No No Yes 
R2 0.2874 0.8268 0.3541 
All regressions include the same data and covariates as in Table 5.2 
 
The results from this test highlight the effect that government hospitals’ presence has on 
the way in which demand shocks affect the convergence trend. The test provides 
additional evidence for the lower responsiveness of public hospitals relative to private 
ones. Nevertheless, note that this is a test of the model’s assumptions rather than the 
model’s predictions 
                                                 
110 Note that the null and alternative hypotheses are not nested. I could not reject the null hypothesis that 
β1=0; I can reject both the null hypothesis that β2=0 and the joint null hypothesis that β1+β2=0. In addition, 
note that the sign of β2 is negative as expected. 
